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INSIGHT INTO LAWYERING: BERNARD
LONERGAN'S CRITICAL REALISM APPLIED TO
JURISPRUDENCEt
ANTHONY J. FEJFAR*
I. INTRODUCTION
In his thoughtful commentary, FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE, [ Jerome Hall dis-
cusses the adequacy of several legal philosophies which serve as foundations for contem-
porary jurisprudence. Hall opines that a legal philosophy is only adequate:
(1) [Of it is relevant to current social-legal problems and intellectual interests;
(2) if it clarifies legal concepts.. .;
(3) if it is internally consistent; and
(4) if it comprehends "the variety of [legal] experience within the limits of
one scheme of ideas."2
Hall notes that natural law, 3 legal positivism,' and legal realism 3 each provide an uncer-
tain foundation for an adequate jurisprudence. What is needed, says Hall, is a dynamic
theory which can take into account the existence of "law as rules" in our society. 6 Critical
'Copyright © 1986 Anthony J. Fejfar.
*Practicing attorney at Baird, Holm, McEachen, Pedersen, Hamann & Strasheim, Omaha,
Nebraska; B.A. Crieghton University 1981; J.D. University of Nebraska College of Law 1985. The
author wishes to thank Mary Alice Haley, Gene Donahue, and John Snowden, without whom this
article would not have been written.
' J. HALL, FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1973).
2 Id. at 19 (quoting A. WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY 4 (1930)).
See infra text accompanying note 150.
4 See infra text accompanying note 152.
See infra text accompanying note 155.
6 J. HALL, supra note 1, at 161.
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realism, as developed by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, 7
 provides such a dynamic theory.
Although Lonergan has taken into account most of the scientific and philosophic
achievements of the preceding centuries, his approach to philosophy differs radically
from that of his predecessors. 8 This is so because Lonergan has recognized that human
knowing "is not some single operation or activity but, on the contrary, a whole whose
parts are cognitional activities."9 Human knowing is composed of three distinct yet
interrelated operations: experience, understanding, and judgment. Thus, in order for
a person to know how it is that he or she knows, he or she cannot just "look" at
understanding.'° Rather, it is Lonergan's position that if the reader is attentive to and
reflects upon his or her cognitional operations, he or she will find that knowledge comes
not through mere "sense experience" or "taking a look" as many legal philosophers
maintain," but through affirmations which are made on the level of judgment. Accord-
ingly, this article has been structured to provide the reader an occasion to reflect upon
his or her cognitional processes and then judge for himself or herself whether Lonergan's
position is correct.' 2
Because the article is intended in the first instance to reach lawyers and those
interested in legal philosophy, it deals with what it is that lawyers are doing when they
do lawyering. Jurisprudence based on Lonergan's critical realism is to be done by all
persons in the legal community and not just to be studied by academics. Such partici-
pation is needed because as Professor Van Doren notes, it is inevitable that a lawyer
employs some type of jurisprudential foundation,'s and, accordingly, each lawyer should
look to see whether or not that foundation is a solid one.
(1904-1984). Lonergan was born and raised in Canada. After entering the Society of Jesus
( Jesuits), he received the following academic degrees: University of London, A.B. (1930); Gregorian
University (Rome), S.T.L. (1937), S.T.D. (1945). He has held academic positions at: Gregorian
University (Rome), 1953-1965; Regis College (Ontario), 1965-1975; Boston College, Visiting Dis-
tinguished Professor of Theology, 1975-1984; Harvard University Divinity School, Stillman Pro-
fessor, 1971-1972.
B. TYRRELL, BERNARD LONERGAN'S PHILOSOPHY OF GOD 4 (1974).
9 B. LONERGAN, Cognitional S011atlre, in COLLECTION 224 (1967).
'° See id.:
Where knowing is a structure, knowing knowing must he a reduplication of the
structure. Thus, if knowing is just looking, then knowing knowing will be looking at
looking. But if knowing is a conjunction of experience, understanding, and judging,
then knowing knowing has to be a conjunction of (1) experiencing experience, under-
standing, and judging, (2) understanding one's experience of experience, understanding
and judging, and (3) judging one's understanding of experience, understanding, and
judging to be correct.
(emphasis added).
" The naive realists and the empiricists hold the former view, while the idealists hold the latter.
12 The examples employed in this article should not be seen as having any special significance.
The beauty of Lonergan's position is that while the examples may change, the cognitional structure
remains constant.
' 9
 Van Doren, Theories of Professors H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin — A Critique, 29 CLEV. ST .
L. REV. 279 (1980). Professor Van Doren states:
in the United States, jurisprudence has long been believed to be esoteric and lacking
in practical significance. However, if it is true that every law professor teaches juris-
prudence, then it is also true that every lawyer practices it. Conscious and unconscious
decisions made by professors, judges, and practitioners reflect jurisprudential pref-
erences.
Id. at 279.
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To begin at the beginning is to begin with the basics, thus the first section will discuss
the notion of experiential or empirical consciousness.
II. EXPERIENCE
On the level of experiential or empirical consciousness, a human being experiences
the world as an "already out there now real."" When operating solely on this level of
consciousness, he or she does not seem to differ from the higher animals. Lonergan
notes that such experiential consciousness is analogous to that of a kitten.' 5 A kitten is
awake, and its stream of consciousness basically involves a higher technique for achieving
biological ends. This extroverted consciousness is directed toward possible opportunities
or means to satisfy appetites. It is spatial, temporal, and concerned with the "real." Thus,
the kitten is interested in lapping real milk and is disappointed when confronted with a
realistic photograph of a saucer of milk. 16
A human being as "animal" is simila .rly situated. On this level he or she lives in a
world unmediated by meaning. 17 It is a world of "pleasure and pain, hunger and thirst,
food and drink, rage and satisfaction and sleep."'s As Lonergan notes, this level is most
easily recognized and isolated in the world of the infant:
Itihe world of the infant is no bigger than the nursery. It is the world of
what is felt, touched, grasped, sucked, seen, heard. It is a world of immediate
experience, of the given as given, of image and affect without any perceptible
intrusion from insight or concept, reflection or judgment, deliberation or
choice.'`'
It is on this level of empirical consciousness that all human beings, infant or adult,
experience data. This data may be introverted or extroverted, for a human being
experiences his or her own emotions and feelings as well as all that he or she hears,
smells, sees, and touches. But, as Lonergan points out, empirical consciousness and
intentionality only provide a basis for further activities.
III. INSIGHT
"Insight," as referred to by Lonergan, is an act of understanding which unifies the
data of sense and consciousness by placing them in a single explanatory perspective.
Insight can be described as follows: (1) It comes as a release to the tension of inquiry;
(2) it comes suddenly and unexpectedly; (3) it is a function not of outer circumstances
but of inner conditions; (4) it pivots between the concrete and the abstract; (5) it passes
into the habitual texture of one's inind. 20
Insight occurs routinely in all the different activities and areas of our lives. By way
of an easily understood example," Fitzpatrick describes insight occurring in the context
14 B. LONERGAN, INSIGUT: A STUDY IN HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 251 (1958).
15 Id.
16 Id.
" See generally B. LONERGAN, METFion IN THEOLOGY 57-99 (1972).
18 Id. at 76.
' 9 Id.
20 B. LONERGAN, Supra note 14, at 3-4.
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of a man confined in a prison who is seeking to escape. 2 1 In Fitzpatrick's scenario, a
prisoner desperately wants to know how to escape. He sees a few loose bricks, a wooden
plank and a rope. On a purely experiential or empirical level, each of these objects
would be merely "bodies;" they would be "already out there now real" as sense data, but
they would have no meaning to the subject. Because of past insights, however, the
prisoner now understands them to be "things" which can be used for certain purposes.
For example, the rope can be thrown or attached and then used for climbing up and
down.
In response to the tension of inquiry, the prisoner unifies his accumulated insights
and comes to a higher viewpoint or new unifying insight: "an escape routel"22 As
Fitzpatrick points out, this insight does not just "fall out of the sky" — that is, the
experiencing of the data alone does not produce the insight. Rather, the desired insight
occurs as a unified result of previous insights which coalesce to yield an answer to the
question of the search.
Once this insight has been reached by the subject himself, or reached by another
and communicated to him, it does not have to be made again. Thus, when identical
circumstances arise in the future, the prisoner will realize that an escape route is present
without having to reach the insight all over again. As Fitzpatrick puts it, "[o]ver a period
of time insights accumulate and cognitive dispositions and habits are built up enabling
us to 'read off' facts or situations without apparent effort; or we commonly take over
the insights of others and these become part of our habitual mental furniture," 23
As one might guess, insight occurs in many other contexts besides that described in
the above hypothetical. The law student, for example, in order to accomplish his first
research project, must grasp, acquire, and accumulate many insights. Thus, if the student
has not gained insight into how to use the West digest system 24 or the Shepards system, 25
2I Fitzpatrick, Lonergan and Hume, 63 NEW BLACKFRIARS 122-30, 219-28, 275-86, 364-72
(1982).
22 Id. at 126. Here the insights would be that: a plank can be propped up against the wall for
a boost up; the loose bricks can be removed for toe holds; the rope can be used to climb down the
other side.
Id. at 127, The notion of direct insight differs from that of inverse insight:
While direct insight grasps the point, or sees the solution, or comes to know the reason,
inverse insight apprehends that in some fashion the point is that there is no point, or
that the solution is to deny a solution, or that the reason is that rationality of the real
admits distinctions and qualifications.
B. LONERGAN, supra note 14, at 19. Lonergan uses the example of an irrational number as an
instance where inverse insight reveals a "surd." See id. at 20.
24 "The most well-developed and probably still the most widely used method of case location is
the one developed by the West Publishing Company." M. COHEN & R. BERRING, How To FIND THE
LAW 100 (8th ed. 1983).
" See id. at 250:
[Clonstant change is a basic characteristic of our legal system. With courts and legis-
latures at the federal and state levels producing 50,000 new appellate decisions and
many thousands of new statutes every year, the standing and authority of previous
cases and laws are always subject to either sudden change or gradual erosion. Decisions
may be reversed, overruled, criticized, questioned or distinguished. Similarly, statutes
may be repealed, amended, superceded, or declared unconstitutional. The researcher
must therefore determine the current status of every primary legal source which
appears to be relevant to the issue at hand. This function is usually performed by an
ingenious series of citators called Shepard's Citations. These citators trace the judicial
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disaster is likely to strike. If no insight is present to unify the data, the numbers and
letters in these systems are virtually meaningless.
How would insight into these systems occur in a law student? First, a number of
underlying insights would have to have been made or acquired. At a very basic level, a
student must understand the meaning of the numbers and language employed within
the systems. Next, he or she would have to understand the way the respective systems
are organized, such as key numbers 26 and citator columns. 27 Finally, he or she would
have to have gained insight into those situations where the systems can be effectively
utilized. These insights could then coalesce into a higher unifying insight as to what each
system is and what it can do.
Insight also occurs in virtually every facet of law practice, including trial work. A
good trial attorney will have made, acquired, and accumulated insights into how judges
handle cases. For example, a lawyer might feel free to omit laying a foundation for
evidence involving inconsequential or uncontroverted matters. The insight acted upon
is that the judge will want to speed the trial along and will overrule objections made by
opposing counsel.
Although insight is common in the legal context, so too is that which Lonergan
refers to as "oversight." 28 Oversight is the converse of insight; it involves activity which
is unintelligent rather than intelligent; missing the point rather than getting the point. 29
history of every published decision, and the later legislative and judicial treatment of
every enacted statute.
26 See id. at 100:
John] West [the founder of West Publishing], divided all forseeable legal situations
into seven major categories: Persons; Property; Contracts; Torts; Crimes; Remedies;
and Government. These seven areas were then subdivided into more than 400 indi-
vidual legal topics. Each of the topics was then further sub-divided into sub-topics,
and even narrower refinement, with each of the resulting sub-topics assigned a clas-
sification number, which West called a "key number." Some of the larger or more
complex topics had thousands of key numbers for their numerous sub-topics and finer
subdivisions, while smaller topics had only a few. West thereby created a subject
framework that sought to provide a particular topic and a key number subdivision to
cover eve?) conceivable legal situation that could be treated in a case. To some observ-
ers, this was an impressive effort of enormous intellectual import for American juris-
prudence, while to others it represented an oversimplification and potential distortion
of the legal universe.
" See id. at 250:
Having located, read, and established the relevance of a primary authority (whether
a decision, a statute or an administrative regulation or ruling), the researcher must
then ascertain the current status of that text. This is done by searching the history of
the source in a citator. Since the most comprehensive system of citators are SHEPARD'S
CITATIONS, the process is called Shepardizing a case, statute or administrative document.
Shepardizing is simply a way of verifying the current authority of the legal source ... .
Shepard's citators facilitate this verification of authority by listing the citation of
every published decision, and then following that entry with the citation of every
subsequent decision which has mentioned the cited decision. If the court in the
subsequent decision indicated some specific action or attitude with regard to the earlier
case (e.g., reversed or affirmed it, criticized or questioned it, overruled it or followed
it), that action or attitude is noted by one of a series of alphabetic symbols representing
that treatment. The same method is used for statutes ....
B. LONERGAN, SRPTO, note 14, at xiv.
29 Oversight differs from inverse insight. See supra note 23.
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For example, the first-year law student, when embarking upon a research assignment,
may not get the point that cases are sometimes reversed or overruled. Thus, oversight
into researching would involve not using the Shepard's system to check to see if the cases
he or she is relying upon are still "good law."
Oversight, or not getting the point, can also occur when practicing lawyers venture
into unfamiliar legal terrain. For example, the practitioner who ordinarily deals with
criminal matters may be totally lost when he or she tries to interpret the Internal Revenue
Code and the accompanying tax regulations. Thus, the lawyer goes to a BNA Portfolio"
for a discussion of the particular tax question. After reading the material, something
clicks, insight occurs, and the Code section seems the easiest thing in the world to
understand.
IV. UNDERSTANDING
As noted above, insights occur as a release from the tension of inquiry. This tension
or "drive to understand" is an attribute or characteristic of intelligence which is uniquely
human. When allowed free reign, this drive pushes us to ask all the relevant questions
and seek all the relevant answers. The human being, when confronted with the world
of experience, asks who? what? why? where? how? how many? As Lonergan puts it:
Deep within us all, emergent when the noise of other appetites is stilled,
there is a drive to know, to understand, to see why, to discover the reason,
to find the cause, to explain. Just what is wanted, has many names. In what
precisely it consists, is a matter of dispute. But the fact of inquiry is beyond
all doubt. It can absorb a man. It can keep him for hours, day after day,
year after year, in the narrow prison of his study or his laboratory. It can
send him on dangerous voyages of exploration. It can withdraw him from
other interests, other pursuits, other pleasures, other achievements. It can
fill his waking hours, hide from him the world of ordinary affairs, invade
the very fabric of his dreams. It can demand endless sacrifices that are made
without regret though there is only the hope, never a certain promise, of
success. What better symbol could one find for this obscure, exigent, impe-
rious drive, than a man, naked, running, excitedly crying, "I've got it?" 3 '
Within the broader context of "understanding," there are two types of insight that
can be distinguished; one does not go beyond the present concrete situation, and one
3n The Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) publishes "Tax Management Portfolios," which are
described by BNA as follows:
The heart of the [BNA] Tax Management Program is in its continuing series of
individual Portfolios, each dealing in depth with a deliberately narrowed area of
corporate, estate, or personal tax problems.
Examples of the subject matter of individual Portfolios are "Estimated Tax,"
"Deferred Compensation Arrangements," "Estate Tax Marital Deduction," or "Foreign
Tax Credit."
Each Portfolio is prepared by one or more active practitioners carefully chosen
for recognized expertise in the subject area, and each is designed to bring together in
one place the information and guidance needed to solve a particular tax problem,
develop effective tax strategies, and implement decisions.
Tax Management, (BNA) Master Binder, at 4 (Dec. 23, 1980).
-" B. LONERGAN, supra note 14, at 4.
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does. Thus, the hypothetical prison inmate may confine his escape plan to his original
circumstance only, or he may apply the insight conceptually, by analogy or generaliza-
tion,52 to other situations. In both generalization and analogy, "what is at work is the
law, immanent and operative in [the] cognitional process, that similars are [to be] similarly
understood. Unless there is a significant difference in the data, there cannot be a differ-
ence in understanding the data."ss
As Lonergan points out, it is natural for all human beings to generalize and anal-
ogize. What is taught in law school, therefore, is not the ability to generalize, but the
ability to recognize significant differences in legal data. Thus, one case is seen as "con-
trolling" a latter case while another is distinguished. Some facts are deemed relevant,
while others are not, depending upon the context.
For example, in a case dealing with a car collision where a personal-injury theory is
involved, the place where the plaintiff lives is probably not significant in relation to the
merits of the case." Conversely, in a case involving a personal injury where a person has
been struck by a golf ball while mowing her yard, the location of the plaintiff's home
along the back nine of a golf course may be highly relevant." Thus, to a great extent,
" Analogy and generalization are described by Lonergan as follows:
An argument from analogy assumes that some concrete situation, A, is correctly
understood. It argues that some other similar situation, B, is to be understood in the
same fashion.
A generalization makes the same assumption to argue that any other similar
situation, X, is to be understood in the same fashion.
Id. at 287-88 (emphasis added).
" Id. (emphasis added). In the legal context, John Austin says much the same thing as Lonergan,
although employing slightly different language. Analogy and generalization for Lonergan are,
respectively, specific analogy and generic analogy for Austin:
In truth, when it is said that a litigated case is analogous to another case, one of the
following meanings is commonly imported by the phrase. It is meant that the litigated
case bears to the other case, a specific and proximate resemblance; and that the former
ought to be decided, on account of the alleged resemblance, by a given statute or rule
in which the latter is included. Or else it is meant that the litigated bears to the other
case a generic and remoter resemblance; and that the former should be brought or
forced, on account of the alleged resemblance, within a statute or rule by which the
latter is comprised: that is to say, that a new rule of judiciary law, resembling a statute
or rule by which the latter is comprised, ought to be made by the Court, and applied
to the case in controversy.
J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 1039 (3d ed. 1869), reprinted in J. HALL, READINGS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 566 (1938).
34 At issue in such a case would be whether the defendant negligently struck another car while
driving down the street. Assuming that jurisdiction and venue are not a problem, the place where
the plaintiff lived at the time of the accident, although perhaps mentioned in the judge's opinion,
probably had no bearing whatsoever on the outcome of the case.
" The location of the plaintiff's home may be highly relevant because of the doctrine of
"assumption of risk," which is a defense to negligence. Prosser describes the doctrine as it probably
would be applied in the golf-course situation as follows:
[Assumption of risk can occur] where the plaintiff voluntarily enters into some relation
with the defendant, with knowledge that the defendant will not protect him against
one or more future risks that may arise from the relation. He may then be regarded
as tacitly or impliedly consenting to the negligence, and agreeing to take his own chances.
Thus, he may ... enter a baseball park, sit in an unscreened seat, and so consent that
the players may proceed with the game without taking any precautions to protect him
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learning to "think like a lawyer" for purposes of law school really means learning to
recognize what lawyers, judges, and law professors consider to be "significant" differences
in the data and what they do not."
While law school and lawyering do involve abstract or purely logical generalization,
much of the cognitive activity performed by law students and lawyers involves "common
sense" insights and generalizations. According to Lonergan, Iclommon sense is that
vague name given to the unknown source of a large and floating population of elemen-
tary judgments which everyone makes, everyone relies on, and almost everyone regards
as obvious and indisputable."'" It is a specialization involving practical intelligence which
deals in the particular and concrete. Lonergan points out that common sense is common
without being general, because
kit consists in a set of insights that remain incomplete, until there is added
at least one further insight into the situation at hand; and, once that situation
has passed, the added insight is no longer relevant, so that common sense at
once reverts to its normal state of incompleteness."
While common sense may seem to generalize, a generalization proposed by common
sense differs from a generalization proposed by science" or formal logic. Lonergan notes
that "[t]he scientific generalization aims to offer a premise from which correct deductions
can be drawn. But the generalizations issued by common sense are not meant to be premises for
deductions. Rather, they would communicate pointers that ordinarily it is well to bear in
from being hit by the ball. Again, the legal result is that the defendant is simply
relieved of the duty which would otherwise exist.
W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 68, at 481 (5th ed. 1984). In the hypothetical
golf-course situation, assumption of risk may come into play if the plaintiff's home was built after
the golf course was operating. The argument would he that the homeowner took the risk that golf
balls would enter her backyard.
36 Almost all law schools employ the "case method" as the predominate means of instruction.
This method has been in existence in the United States since the latter half of the nineteenth
century. According to William Langdell, its founder, "'What qualifies a person to teach law,' is
not experience in the work of a lawyer's office, not experience in dealing with men, not experience
in the trial or argument of causes, not experience, in short, in using law, but experience in learning
law. — J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 226 (1949). This
learning involves studying the "law" as a science: "'[L]aw is a science; [and] all the available materials
of that science are contained in printed books. — Id. (quoting Dean Langdell).
In evaluating this "scientific" method of teaching, Jerome Frank observes:
Langdell invented, and our leading law-schools still employ, the so-called "case system."
That is, the students are supposed to study cases. They do not. They study, almost
entirely, upper court opinions. Any such opinion, however, is not a case, but a small
fraction of a case, its tail end. The law students are like future horticulturists studying
solely cut flowers; or like future architects studying merely pictures of buildings. They
resemble prospective dog-breeders who never see anything but stuffed dogs. [Says
Frank,] (Perhaps there is a correlation between such stuffed-dog legal education and
the over-production of stuffed shirts in my profession.)
Id. at 227 (footnote omitted). The thrust of Frank's argument is valid, since as shown in this article,
the view of "law" as a "pure science" is totally inadequate.
37 B. LONERCAN, supra note 14, at 289.
Id. at 175.
" Scientific generalizations are usually expressed as classical or statistical laws. Classical laws are
universal and constant, e.g., all other things being equal: Force — Mass x Acceleration. Statistical
laws, on the other hand are concerned with the probabilities from which relative actual frequencies
of events may diverge at random. See id. at 63-69.
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mind."40 These "pointers" do not aim to express the scientist's rounded set of insights
that either holds in every instance or none at all. But rather, they aim to express the
incomplete set of insights which is called upon in every concrete instance but becomes
proximately relevant only after a good look around has resulted in additional insights.'"
Much of a law student's education, as well as a lawyer's practice, involves common
sense, rather than purely logical or scientific understanding. As was noted earlier, law
school teaches the student to "generalize like a lawyer." While this education seems at
times to involve purely logical or abstract generalization, it also provides the student
with a group of common-sense insights which enable him or her to make common-sense
generalizations.
For example, a first-year student,. George, has just received from his adjunct pro-
fessor his first legal-writing assignment after it has been graded. There are numerous
red marks on the paper, the thrust of which could be summarized as follows: 1) improper
Blue Book42 citation form and 2) sentences are too long. George looks his paper over
and comes to the common-sense insight that in order to receive a better grade on his
next assignment he must be more careful with his citation form and write more terse
sentences. Because his research and analysis seemed to provoke no comment, he con-
cludes that the methods used in that regard were adequate.
Armed with his previously acquired common-sense insights, as well as his new ones,
George proceeds to tackle his next assignment. He uses proper citation form and writes
his memo in a style analogous to "See Spot and Jane run." George hands his paper in
and is pleased when he learns that he received an "A" on his assignment.
One would think that after the accumulation of the insights noted above, George
now has legal writing mastered. Alas, the world of common sense, of practical living, is
not so easy. For the next semester rolls around, and once again George is given a legal
writing assignment. This time, however, George is assigned to a different adjunct pro-
fessor. Without really considering this change in personnel, George completes his as-
signment and anticipates another "A" on his paper. Thus, George is horrified when he
receives his paper, covered with red marks, captioned with a grade of "C." Somewhat
irate, George goes to the next meeting of his legal writing section. At the meeting, the
adjunct announces to the class, with great consternation, that it is obvious to him that
schools are no longer teaching the youth of America how to read and write. Says the
professor, "most of these papers look as though they're written for a sixth-grade audi-
ence."
George is simply flabbergasted. Why? Because he did not recognize how common-
sense generalizations function. They are necessarily incomplete and only become com-
plete when the data and insights of the situation at hand are considered. Once the
situation at hand is past, the common-sense generalization again becomes incomplete,
awaiting its next application. The generalization is merely a pointer, not a conclusion
deducible from premises.
Common-sense generalizations certainly are not confined to law school. Rather, they
permeate the entire "legal world." Trial lawyers, for example, operate on many common-
sense insights and generalizations. The lawyer recognizes that Judge Smith likes an
40 Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
4 ' Id.
42 A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (14th ed. 1986), more commonly known as the "Blue Book,"
is a legal style book published by the Harvard Law Review Association.
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intellectual argument but also understands that this generalization does not necessarily
apply to Judge Jones. Thus, Jerome Frank notes:
Practicing lawyers, therefore, attempt to learn the idiosyncracies of particular
trial judges: Judge Brown is known as a former railroad lawyer, who, fearful
of showing favoritism, leans over backwards and is likely to be unduly hostile
to railroads. Judge Green, who for years had served in the office of the city's
Corporation Counsel, is partial to municipalities. Judge Blue is markedly
puritanical. Armed with such information, lawyers try to have (or avoid
having) some cases tried before certain judges."
Again, this type of generalization differs completely from scientific generalization,
for the incomplete set of insights which is called upon in every concrete situation becomes
proximately relevant only after a good look around has resulted in the additional insights.
For example, a student should look at the scouting report on his new legal-writing
adjunct before leaping into a new project.
V. THE WORLD MEDIATED BY MEANING
But if common-sense insights and generalizations occur often in the practice of law,
they do not occur in a vacuum. Rather, they occur within a common context, which is
"[t]he world mediated by meaning."'"
Lonergan describes four unique but interrelated functions or aspects of meaning:
cognitive, constitutive, communicative, and effective. Cognitive meaning takes us out of
the infant's world of immediacy and places us in an adult's world, which is a world
mediated by meaning. The immediate world of the infant is very limited; "[i]t is the
world of what is felt, touched, grasped, sucked, seen, heard."" It is a world of immediate
experience where the operations of insight or concept, reflection or judgment, deliber-
ation or choice do not seem to be present."
As a child develops, however, his world expands enormously. The use of language
usually marks the entrance into this larger world, for, as Lonergan points out, "[w]ords
denote not only what is present but also what is absent or past or future, not only what
45 1 FitArrx, supra note 36, at 155.
44 See generally B. LONERGAN, supra note 17, at 57-99. The sections dealing with meaning follow
the discussion of insight and understanding, but precede the section dealing with judgment. The
sections have been so ordered because meaning can involve either the level of understanding, or
judgment, depending upon the context:
The formal act of meaning is an act of conceiving, thinking, considering, defining,
supposing, formulating. There has emerged the distinction between meaning and
meant, for the meant is what is conceived, thought, considered, defined, supposed,
formulated. However, the precise nature of this distinction has not yet been clarified.
One is meaning precisely what one is thinking about, but one has yet to determine
whether the object of one's thought is merely an object of thought or something more
than that.
The full act of meaning is an act of judging. One settles the status of the object
of thought, that it is merely an object of thought, or a mathematical entity, or a real
thing lying in the world of human experience, or a transcendent reality beyond that
world.
Id. at 74.
45 1d. at 76.
46 Id.
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is factual but also the possible, the ideal, the normative." 47 Thus, words express not only
what each person has found out for himself or herself, but also what he or she can learn
"Mrom the memories of other men, from the common sense of the community, from
the pages of literature, from the labors of scholars, from the investigations of scientists,
from the experience of saints, from the mediations of philosophers and theologians." 4 B
This larger world — the real world in which we live our lives — does not lie within
anyone's immediate experience, for meaning is an act that does not merely repeat but
goes beyond experiencing. Thus, there is a second function or aspect of meaning, that
of meaning as constitutive: "[j]ust as language is constituted by articulate sound and
meaning, so social institutions and human cultures have meanings as intrinsic compo-
nents."49 Thus, families, the state, and the law are all inextricably involved in acts of
meaning. Each of these institutions or systems or relations "is," but only insofar as persons
judge or accept them to be so.
A third function or aspect of meaning is communicative. As Lonergan notes "[w]hat
one [person] means is communicated to another intersubjectively, artistically, symboli-
cally, linguistically, incarnately."5° While meanings originate in single minds, they become
common only through successful and widespread communication. Thus, Lonergan
points out that meanings can be and are transmitted to successive generations by way of
formal and informal education and training: "[s]lowly and gradually they are clarified,
expressed, formulated, defined, only to be enriched and deepened and transformed,
and no less often to be impoverished, emptied out and deformed.""
Finally, a fourth function of meaning is efficient or effective meaning. As human
beings, we build, act in, and create our world. We produce concrete or actual "effects"
in our world not only in the physical realm, but also in the social or institutional realm.
As Lonergan notes, "men work. But their work is not mindless." 52 The projects men
undertake, they first intend. They imagine, they plan, they do research, they weigh pros
and cons, they enter into contracts. Lonergan notes,Ifirom the beginning to the end of
the process, we are engaged in acts of meaning; and without them the process would
not occur or the end be achieved." 53 Thus, the whole of the effective man-made artificial
world is "[t]he cumulative, now planned, now chaotic, product of human acts of mean-
in g."5"
Each of the above-mentioned functions of meaning is present in the "legal world"
or "legal process." Our whole legal "system" is a world of meaning. What is, for example,
a "corporation?" Is it the main business office, the employees, or the officers? It is none
of these. A "corporation" is something beyond the mere physical realities. It is a legal
construct which somehow extends beyond each person's experience of it. A "corporation"
denotes a legal "entity" characterized by persons treating each other and the physical
world in a certain manner, each one employing the cognitive function of meaning,
inasmuch as he or she intends or judges "corporation" to have a certain meaning.
47
 Id. at 76-77.
48 Id. at 77.
49 Id. at 78.
s' Id.
5 ' Id. at 78-79.
52 1d. at 77.
55 Id. at 78.
54 Id.
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Furthermore, the corporation has meaning and "exists" only as constituted. Without a
commonly recognized mode of social interaction or meaning there would be no "cor-
poration." Its existence is entirely dependent upon individuals in the society or com-
munity thinking, judging, and acting in a certain manner. Thus, a corporation as con-
stituted can differ over time. For example, at the present time an element of the meaning
of a corporation as constituted by our society or culture is that its shareholders, generally
speaking, are only potentially liable for damages against the corporation to the extent
of their investment. 55 However, if this mode of social interaction were to change within
society or the community, then the "corporation" would be constituted differently. Such
a change in constitution could occur in a variety of ways. Everyone could informally or
spontaneously change social relationships and ways of acting, or more likely, legislation
or court decisions could evoke a new mode of social interaction.
If "corporation" is constituted throughout our society differently than before, a
change in meaning will have to have been communicated. This communication, as noted
above, could be accomplished informally as a "grass roots" movement, or formally,
through the institutional mechanism of government. In either case, what is involved is
the communication of a new mode of social interaction, which spreads by example,
custom, or instruction.
Finally, as persons become aware that "corporation" as previously constituted no
longer "exists," the effective function of meaning comes into play, and the new meaning
as constituted becomes effective. Persons having dealings with the corporation will rec-
ognize that the dynamic meaning structure or mode of social interaction which constitutes
"corporation" has changed, and their actions will produce concrete effects that might
otherwise not obtain. 56
The above illustration has been "plucked" out of the "legal world" without regard
to that larger context. For the corporation exists within the larger world mediated by
meaning. Our entire legal "system" or "institution" involves countless meanings which
are cognized, constituted, communicated, and made effective. A "court" is a court, a
"legislature" is a legislature, and a "lawyer" is a lawyer only because human beings in
particular, and society in general, both today and in the past, have constituted and made
effective a certain meaning structure or mode of social interaction. Thus, Lonergan
points out that "[t]he family, the state, the law, the economy are not fixed and immutable
entities. They adapt to changing circumstances; they can be reconceived in the light of
new ideas; they can be subjected to revolutionary change." 57 For change to occur in any
65
 "Statutes often provide that a shareholder is under no obligation to the corporation or its
creditors with respect to one's shares other than the obligation to pay to the corporation the full
lawful consideration for such shares." H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 202 (3d ed. 1983).
' 6 It could be objected that the four functions or aspects of meaning discussed above do not
seem readily distinguishable. This is in some sense a valid criticism. However, the distinction seems
to be one of emphasis rather than a strict demarcation. The cognitive function emphasizes the
individual thought process of meaning. The communicative function emphasizes the transference
of meaning from one person to another person or persons. The constitutive function emphasizes
the role of meaning in the individual and culture defining who or what they are. And finally,
effective meaning emphasizes the concrete results of meaning. While each of the functions do
emphasize a different aspect of meaning, it is apparent that there could be many instances where
several of the functions would be present in a single meaning act.
57
 See B. LONERGAN, supra note 17, at 78.
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of these institutions, there must be an accompanying change in meaning. Lonergan notes
that "[t]he state can be changed by rewriting its constitution. More subtly but no less
effectively it can be changed by reinterpreting the constitution or, again, by working on
men's minds and hearts to change the objects that command their respect, hold their
allegiance, fire their loyalty." 58
VI. THE WORLD OF COMMON-SENSE MEANING
Previously, common sense was discussed as one of the ways in which the lawyer
relates to or understands his world. This section will analyze common sense from another
viewpoint. Common sense will be viewed as an object or principle which shapes the
world in which we live.
Longeran notes that "common sense is practical. It seeks knowledge, not for the
sake of the pleasure of contemplation, but to use knowledge in making and doing." 59
According to Lonergan, common sense can be seen as a principle which has been present
throughout the development of human society. He notes that practical intelligence
produces practical ideas which are in turn manifested by technology. As technology
develops, goods are first bartered, then bought and sold, and an economy is born. The
existence of an economy evokes the political society. And finally, since the problem of
effective agreement in that society is recurrent, the political or legal specialization of
common sense develops.6°
This legal/political specialization of common sense both initiates and coordinates
social responses in order to effect social change. Lonergan points out that while this
specialization involves some understanding of industry and of commerce, its special field
is dealing with people: "[di has to discern when to push for full performance and when
to compromise, when delay is wisdom and when it spells disaster, when widespread
consent must be awaited and when action must be taken in spite of opposition." 6 ' And,
perhaps having the trial attorney in mind, he states further that this common sense must
also "It* able to command attention and to win confidence, to set forth concretely the
essentials of a case, to make its own decisions and secure the agreement of others, to
initiate and carry through some section of that seriation of social responses meeting
social challenges .... "62
Perhaps the most profound insight in relation to traditional jurisprudence involves
Lonergan's recognition that the common-sense "world" within which the legal/political
specialization of common sense operates cannot be scientifically analyzed in the same
way that the nonsentient world can. For, as seen below, the world of common sense is
intelligent as well as intelligible and thus does not operate in the same manner as, for
example, a planetary system.
[A] planetary system results from the conjunction of the abstract laws of
mechanics with a suitable concrete set of mass velocities. In parallel fashion,
there are human schemes that emerge and function automatically, once there
occurs an appropriate conjunction of abstract laws and concrete circum-
55 Id.
54 See B. LONERGAN, supra note 14, at 207.
fi0 1d. at 209.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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stances. But, as human intelligence develops, there is a significant change of
roles. Less and less importance attaches to the probabilities of appropriate
constellations of circumstances. More and more importance attaches to the
probabilities of the occurrence of insight, communication, agreement, deci-
sion. Man does not have to wait for his environment-to make him. His
dramatic living needs only the clues and the opportunities to originate and
maintain its own setting. The advance of technology, the formation of capital,
the development of the economy, the evolution of the state are not only
intelligible but also intelligent. Because they are intelligible, they can be
understood as are the workings of emergent probability in the fields of
physics, chemistry, and biology. But because they also are increasingly intel-
ligent, increasingly the fruit of insight and decision, the analogy of merely
natural process becomes less and less relevant. What possesses a high prob-
ability in one country, or period, or civilization, may possess no probability
in another; and the ground of the difference may lie only slightly in outward
and palpable material factors and almost entirely in the set of insights that
are accessible, persuasive, and potentially operative in the community ...."
Thus, while the world of human activity can be analyzed from a scientific point of view,
it cannot be described adequately in some abstract relation characterized by definitions,
postulates, or deductions. Lonergan states that Title practical common sense of a group,
like all common sense, is an incomplete set of insights that is ever to be completed
differently in each concrete situation. Its adaptation is too continuous and rapid for it
ever to stand fixed in some set of definitions, postulates, and deductions."64
 Thus,
Lonergan concludes that "to understand the working of even a static social structure,
one must inquire from many men in many walks of life and, as best one can, discover
the functional unity that organically binds together the endlessly varied pieces of an
enormous jig-saw puzzle."65
The existence of this 'jig-saw puzzle world," composed of pieces that are "vast
structures of interdependence," forces a new notion of human good upon society: the
good of order. Lonergan points out that "Etlhis good of order is not some entity dwelling
apart from human actions and attainments. Nor is it any unrealized ideal that ought to
be but is not."66 Rather, it is a single "order" which "ramifies through the whole com-
munity to constitute the link between conditioning actions and conditioned results and
to close the circuit of interlocked schemes of recurrence." 67
 Thus, economic breakdown
and political decay are at bottom the breakdown and decay of the good of order; the
failure of schemes of recurrence to function. 68
"Id at 210-11.
64 Id. at 211.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 213.
67 Id. A brief summary of the notion of a scheme of recurrence is as follows:
IC]lassical and statistical laws can coalesce into a single, unified intelligibility commen-
surate with the universe of our experience. ... On the one hand, the world of our
experience is full of continuities, oscillations, rhythms, routines, alternations, circula-
tions, regularities. On the other hand, the scheme of recurrence not only squares with
this broad fact but also is related intimately both to classical and to statistical laws
Abstractly, the scheme itself is a combination of classical laws. Concretely, schemes
begin, continue, and cease to function in accord with statistical probabilities.
Id. at 117. See id. at 115-28, for a more in-depth discussion.
fib Id. at 213.
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Lonergan reiterates that "Nile good of order is not some design for utopia, some
theoretical ideal, some set of ethical precepts, some code of laws, or some super-insti-
tution."69 Rather, it is concrete: lilt is the actually functioning or malfunctioning set of
'if — then' relationships guiding operators and coordinating operations. It is the ground
whence recur or fail to recur whatever instances of the particular good are recurring or
failing to recur."" Again, as noted above, the good of order is not equated with a code
of laws or a super-institution, because included in the notion of the good of order is
that all-encompassing network of informal relations which spontaneously occur among
persons throughout society who are attempting to live in harmony with one another
apart from or even in spite of the established legal system.
But, the concrete good of order could not exist without human beings first knowing
the world in which they live and then acting to shape it. Thus, the next two sections deal
with judgments of fact and judgments of value.
VII. FACT JUDGMENT
In the previous sections, the cognitive levels of experience and understanding have
been discussed. Knowledge does not occur, however, on the level of experience, for
experience merely involves the perception of the raw sense data which is then unified
on the level of understanding. On the level of understanding, insights are formed, ideas
formulated, hypotheses expounded, meanings and ideas understood. Knowledge of the
" real," however, does not result on this level either. Purely logical coherence, although
a 'necessary condition, is not a sufficient condition to prove that a situation obtains in
the real world.
Knowledge of the real can only be attained on the level of critical judgment, where
the subject asks, "is it so?" and "is my understanding of the data a correct one?" According
to Lonergan, in order for a person to make such a fact judgment, the subject must
perform a mental operation which involves his moving from a "conditioned" to a "vir-
tually unconditioned whose conditions have been fulfilled."71 At first blush this statement
may seem utterly facile, or at the other extreme, utterly incomprehensible to the reader.
Happily, J. Fitzpatrick presents a concise but articulate discussion of this important aspect
of the Lonerganian position."
As Fitzpatrick notes, attached to every prospective judgment of fact are certain
conditions; verification or validation consists precisely in determining whether these
conditions are satisfied. Before the subject can move from the level of understanding to
the level of judgment, the hypothesis, concept, or supposition supplied on the level of
understanding must first be put to the test. This "testing" is accomplished by the subject
reverting to the "givenness" of the data:
69 B. LONERGAN, supra note 17, at 49.
7° Id.
By [a particular good] is meant any entity, whether an object or action, that meets a
need of a particular individual at a given place and time. Needs are to be understood
in the broadest sense; they are not to be restricted to necessities but rather to be
stretched to include wants of every kind.
Id. at 48.
71 Id. at 280.
72 Fitzpatrick, supra note 21, at 220.
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It is precisely the givenness of the data that will test the bright idea put
forward to explain the data. This is a further rational demand before any-
thing can be affirmed as fact; it is, if you like, a further demand for coherence
though the coherence in question at this stage is not logical coherence but
the coherence involved in the suggested explanation or interpretation fitting
the data, cohering with the data. And so it is that to test an explanation or
idea we go back to inspect the data to see if the data confirm or weaken the
explanation or idea. 73
As a means of clarifying his discussion, Fitzpatrick again uses the hypothetical
involving the prisoner attempting to escape. 74 In the hypothetical case of the prisoner
who thought that he had discovered an escape route, a number of "givens" had to be
taken into account. For example, was the plank of wood strong enough to support the
prisoner's weight when propped up against the wall? Were some of the bricks in the
wall removable so as to allow the prisoner adequate footing to scale it? Was the rope
long enough and strong enough for the prisoner to lasso a spike on the top of the wall?
As Fitzpatrick points out, each of the above questions was a condition which must have
been fulfilled before the prisoner could make a secure judgment "[t]here is an escape
route." 75
While each of us, as an enquiring subject, can make fact judgments and thus know
"the real," this does not mean that such judgments can be made in every situation. In
some situations the subject makes the judgment that there simply is not enough data
available to make a judgment of fact. In other situations, only a "probable" judgment
may be appropriate. 76 Where an incorrect judgment of fact occurs, however, it only
means that in that case, the subject's understanding of the data was incorrect, or that
the data were insufficient, not that a correct judgment of fact can never be made. 77
7' Id. at 221.
71 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
Fitzpatrick, .supra note 21, at 221. Lonergan uses the example of affirming the existence of
a typewriter in order to refute the relativist's view of the world. See B. LONERGAN, supra note 14, at
343-45. Also, the cognitional structure, which culminates in an act of judgment, cannot be refuted
in a consistent manner. See infra note 141.
" B. LONERGAN, supra note 14, at 299. Lonergan describes a probable judgment of fact as
follows:
When the virtually unconditioned is grasped by reflective understanding, we affirm
or deny absolutely. When there is no preponderance of evidence in favour of either
affirmation or denial, we can only acknowledge our ignorance. But between these
extremes there is a series of intermediate.positions, and probable judgments are their
outcome.
Probable judgments differ from guesses. In both cases knowledge is incomplete.
In both cases reflective understanding fails to reach the virtually unconditioned. But
the guess is a non-rational venture beyond the evidence that resembles the non-
systematic aspect of events. On the other hand, the probable judgment results from
.rational procedures. Though it rests on incomplete knowledge, still there has to be
some approximation towards completeness. Though it fails to reach the virtually
unconditioned, still it has to be closing in upon that exigent norm. Thus, one may say
that guesses are probably true only in the statistical sense of diverging non-systemat-
ically from true judgments; but probable judgments are probably true in the non-
statistical sense of converging upon true judgments, of approaching them as a limit.
Id. at 299-300.
77 See infra text accompanying note 101 for a discussion of interference with judgment.
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A common example of judgment occurring in the legal world is a lawyer's prelim-
inary evaluation of a client's case. A lawyer acting on a contingent-fee basis must judge
whether or not the case is "a winner." When a lawyer thinks he has "a winner," a number
of givens are taken into account. Are the documents genuine? Will the opposition be
tough? Will the case settle or go to trial? If the case goes to trial, can it be won on the
merits? Each of these questions involves "a conditioned" whose "conditions must be
fulfilled" before a secure judgment, "it's a winner," can be made. In almost all cases,
such a prospective judgment would involve a vulnerable insight." Thus, the lawyer
either would have to suspend judgment or limit judgment to one that is merely probable.
Again, knowledge of the real occurs as a synthesis of the "givenness" of the data
and the subject's cognitional processes. As Fitzpatrick notes, the value of the Lonerganian
analysis is that it shows that reality, in the context of critical realism, exists independently
of the knower: "[Ole fact that conditions which are independent of the subject have to
be met before judgment can validly be made indicates that there is an impersonal,
detachable quality about what is affirmed in judgment — it is independent of the subject
who affirms it."'" Thus, he concludes that what is known is not something that simply
appears to the subject, or seems to him or that he would like, but rather, "knowing is a self-
transcending activity and what is known is potentially public and can become a shared
possession."80
VIII. MORAL JUDGMENT
Fact judgments, however, do not determine whether or not a person acts or does
something in a given situation. Rather, moral judgment, which combines a judgment of
fact with feelings and value, determines the subject's actions. According to Lonergan,
" See B. LONERGAN, supra note 14, at 286-87, for a discussion of insights and judgment in
relation to concrete situations:
Judgment on the correctness of insights supposes the prior acquisition of a large
number of correct insights. But the prior insights are not correct because we judge
them to be correct. They occur within a self-correcting process in which the shortcom-
ings of each insight provoke further questions to yield complementary insights. More-
over, this self-correcting process tends to a limit. We become familiar with concrete
situations; we know what to expect; when the unexpected occurs, we can spot just
what happened and why and what can be done to favour or to prevent such a
recurrence; or, if the unexpected is quite novel, we know enough to recommence the
process of learning and we can recognize when, once more, that self-correcting process
reaches its limit in familiarity with the concrete situation and in easy mastery of it.
[Finally,] [t]here occurs a reflective insight in which at once one grasps
(1) a conditioned, the prospective judgment that a given direct or introspective
insight is correct,
(2) a link between the conditioned and its conditions, and this on introspective
analysis proves to be that an insight is correct if it is invulnerable and it is invulnerable
if there are no further, pertinent questions, and
(3) the fulfillment of the conditions, namely, that the given insight does put an
end to further, pertinent questioning and that this occurs in a mind that is alert,
familiar with the concrete situation, and intellectually master of it.
Id.
79 FITZPATRICK, Supra note 21, at 222.
Id.
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value is a transcendental notion." It is what is intended in questions for deliberation.
Rather than asking, "is it so?," the subject asks "is this action worthwhile for me?" Or,
put another way, 'judgments of fact state or purport to state what is or is not so;
judgments of value state or purport to state what is or is not truly good or really better." 82
According to Lonergan, when a judgment of value occurs, three components unite.
First, there is knowledge of reality and especially of human reality. Second, there are
intentional responses" to values." Third, there is the initial thrust towards moral self-
transcendence constituted by the judgment of value itself. Thus, Lonergan avers:
" B. LONERGAN, supra note 17, at 34. Value is one of several transcendental notions:
Value is a transcendental notion. It is what is intended for questions of delibera-
tion, just as the intelligible is what is intended for questions of intelligence, and just
as truth and being are what are intended in questions for reflection. Such intending
is not knowing. When I ask what, or why, or how, or what for, I do not know the
answers, but already I am intending what would be known if I knew the answers.
When I ask whether this or that is so, I do not as yet know whether or not either is
so, but already I am intending what would be known if I did know the answers. So
when I ask whether this is truly and not merely apparently good, whether that is or
is not worth while, I do not yet know value but I am intending value.
Not only do the transcendental notions promote the subject to full consciousness
and direct him to his goals. They also provide the criteria that reveal whether the
goals are being reached. The drive to understand is satisfied when understanding is
reached but it is dissatisfied with every incomplete attainment and so it is the source
of ever further questions. The drive to truth compels rationality to assent when the
evidence is sufficient but refuses assent and demands doubt whenever evidence is
insufficient. The drive . to .value rewards success in self-transcendence with a happy
conscience and saddens failures with an unhappy conscience.
Id. at 34-35 (footnote omitted).
82 Id, at 37.
83 Lonergan distinguishes non-intentional states or trends and intentional responses:
[Non-intentional states] may be illustrated by such states as fatigue, irritability, bad
humor, anxiety, and the latter by such trends or urges as hunger, thirst, sexual
discomfort, The states have causes. The trends have goals. But the relation of the
feelings to the cause or goal is simply that of effect to cause, of trend to goal. The
feeling itself does not presuppose and arise out of perceiving, imagining, representing
the cause or goal. Rather, one first feels tired and, perhaps belatedly, one discovers
that what one needs is a rest. Or first one feels hungry and then one diagnoses the
trouble as a lack of food.
Intentional responses, on the other hand, answer to what is intended, appre-
hended, represented. The feeling relates us, not just to a cause or an end, but to an
object. Such feeling gives intentional consciousness its mass, momentum, drive, power.
Without these feelings our knowing and deciding would be paper thin. Because of
our feelings, our desires and our fears, our hope or despair, our joys and sorrows,
our enthusiasm and indignation, our esteem and contempt, our trust and distrust, our
love and hatred, our tenderness and wrath, our admiration, veneration, reverence,
our dread, horror, terror, we are oriented massively and dynamically in a world
mediated by meaning. We have feelings about other persons, we feel for them, we
feel with them. We have feelings about our respective situations, about the past, about
the future, about evils to be lamented or remedied, about the good that can, might,
must be accomplished.
Id. at 30-31 (footnote omitted).
" Intermediate between judgments of fact and judgments of value lie apprehensions of value.
Id. at 30. Such apprehensions are made up of intentional feelings. According to Lonergan, these
feelings respond to values in accord with some scale of preference, and, while feelings are usually
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[t]he judgment of value presupposes knowledge of human life, of human
possibilities proximate and remote, of probable consequences of projected
courses of action. When knowledge is deficient, then fine feelings are apt to
be expressed in what is called moral idealism, i.e. lovely proposals that don't
work out and often do more harm than good."
Lonergan also insists, however, that knowledge alone is not enough: "[m]oral feelings
have to be cultivated, enlightened, strengthened, refined, criticized and pruned of odd-
ities."6 Finally, the development of both knowledge and moral feeling can lead to the
discovery of oneself as a moral being and "[t]he realization that one not only chooses
between courses of action but also thereby makes oneself an authentic human being or
an unauthentic one. With that discovery, there emerges in consciousness the significance
of personal value and the meaning of personal responsibility." 7
As in other areas of human living, the legal profession involves numerous value
judgments. The profession is unique, however, in that its members are commonly trying
to say "we don't make value judgments," or that "we don't impose our value judgments
on others." Such statements at best involve self-delusion. An example using an attorney
in private practice is illustrative. When a lawyer files suit on behalf of her client, and
against another party, she is performing a human act. A choice is involved, and an action
is either executed or not. Lawyers will often say, "my role as a lawyer is to function as
an advocate, and therefore I have no choice other than to do what my client dictates
within the bounds of professional responsibility and legality." Such lawyers are not being
honest with either themselves or those to whom they are communicating. For upon
critical reflection, the lawyer knows that she chooses to act or not act, file or not file,
based on a judgment of value involving her knowledge of the world, values, and feelings.
In carrying out the wishes of her client, she has chosen a particular "good."
In so doing, the lawyer only acts authentically if she has opted for that which is
truly worthwhile, rather than only the apparently worthwhile. For, according to Loner-
gan, only insofar as a person regularly opts not for the apparently good, but for the
true good, is that person thereby achieving moral self-transcendence. Lonergan goes on
to point out, "[o]n the other hand, insofar as one's decisions have their principal motives,
not in the values at stake, but in a calculus of the pleasures and pains involved, one is
failing in self-transcendence, in authentic human existence, in the origination of value
in oneself and in one's society." 88
Thus it is apparent that contrary to the assertions of the logical positivists, moral
language and moral judgment are inexorably bound up in the law and the legal process.
understood as being spontaneous, they can be developed since they can be reinforced or curtailed
by the subject. "Such reinforcement and curtailment not only will encourage some feelings and
discourage others but also will modify one's spontaneous scale of preferences." Id. at 32.
In regard to the scale of value preferences, Lonergan delineates several categories. Vital values
include such items as health and strength, grace and vigor. Social values, such as the . good of' order,
condition the vital values of the community. Also in the community, cultural value involves the
quest for meaning and value by each person. It is the function of culture to discover, express,
validate, criticize, correct, develop, improve such meaning and value." Id. Finally, personal and
religious values involve each person in his self-transcendence. Id.
" Id. at 38.
"Id.
" Id.
88 Id. at 50. See supra note 70 for a discussion of particular goods.
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Contrary to the assertions of the legal realists, such value judgments are not necessarily
arbitrary, but only become so if not in accord with the transcendental precept of seeking
that which is truly worthwhile. Thus, as will be seen later, at bottom, moral judgment
involving moral transcendence is what makes laws valid or legitimate — not logical
consistency.
IX. BELIEF
Closely related to, but distinct from judgments of fact and judgments of value is
Lonergan's notion of belief. In the course of living, there is much that each person finds
out for himself, that he knows simply because of his own inner or outer experience,
such as his own sense experiences, insights, and judgments of fact and value. However,
such immanently generated knowledge is but a small fraction of what a person in our
society considers himself to know. As Lonergan points out, "[a man's] immediate expe-
rience is filled out by an enormous context constituted by reports of the experience of
other men at other places and times. His understanding rests not only on his own but
also on the experience of others ...." 89 This understanding involves presuppositions
that he has taken for granted because.they commonly are assumed to-be correct and he
has neither the time nor perhaps the ability to investigate for himself. Accordingly, "the
judgments, by which he assents to truths of fact and of value, only rarely depend
exclusively on his immanently generated knowledge, for such knowledge stands not by
itself in some separate compartment but in symbiotic fusion with a far larger context of
beliefs."80
Belief comes into play in virtually every area in which the lawyer practices. We all
"know" that statutes, regulations, cases, and transcripts depict past actions or events even
though we did not participate in those actions or events. After all, we read these and
take them for granted all the time. But, in each of these circumstances, was the transcript
or the printed case an accurate representation of what really was said or written? The
lawyer only "knows" this through belief.
What then is belief? Lonergan outlines five steps which make up the notion of
belief. The first step is taken not by the subject who believes, but by the person in whom
the subject believes. The source makes possible the process of belief because that which
he tells the subject is true — true in an independent and detachable sense when the
source has exercised the cognitional self-transcendence involved in the true judgment
of fact and the moral self-transcendence involved in the true judgment of value: while
the self-transcendent person cannot transfer to another his own powers of judgment,
he can report what he affirms and what he denies, and that the subject can believe in
him.9 ' The second step which makes up the notion of belief involves a general judgment
as to the value of belief for society:
[This general judgment of value] approves man's division of labor in the
acquisition of knowledge both in its historical and in its social dimensions.
The approval is not uncritical. It is fully aware of the fallibility of believing.
But it finds it obvious that error would increase rather than diminish by a
89 B. LONERGAN, supra note 17, at 41.
90
 Id. at 42.
91 Id. at 45.
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regression to primitivism. So it enters into man's collaboration in the devel-
opment of knowledge, determined to promote truth and combat error.92
The third step is a particular judgment of value involving the trustworthiness of a
witness, a source, or a report, the competence of an expert, or the soundness of judgment
of a teacher, a lawyer, a judge, a statesperson, or a politician. The trustworthiness of the
source, according to Lonergan, can involve the following criteria: (1) Whether the source
reached cognitional self-transcendence in his or her judgments of fact and moral self-
transcendence in his or her judgments of value; (2) whether one's source was critical of
her sources; (3) whether she was truthful and accurate in her statements; (4) whether
her statement is consistent with her prior statements; (5) whether her statement is
consistent with other sources; (6) when everything favors belief except the intrinsic
probability of the statement to be believed, one can ask oneself whether the fault is not
in oneself, whether it is not the limitation of one's own horizon that prevents one from
grasping the intrinsic probability of the statement in question."
The fourth step which makes up the notion of belief — the decision to believe —
involves the choice which follows upon the general and particular judgments of value.
According to Lonergan, "the combination of the general and the particular judgment
yields the conclusion that the statement ought to be believed for, if believing is a good
thing, then what can be believed should be believed. Finally, what should be so, actually
becomes so, through a decision or choice."" The fifth and final step is the act of believing.
Each person, in his own mind, judges to be true the communicated judgment of fact or
value. 95
A common illustration of belief in the legal "world" involves the use of a form book.
A lawyer commonly will turn to a form book in order to draft documents or pleadings
for a specific purpose. In many instances the lawyer has not researched the law relating
to the particular form which she intends to use. She has no doubt as to the validity of
the form, but the absence of doubt is not due to any immanently generated knowledge,
but to belief. In doing so, is the lawyer acting unreasonably or irresponsibly? Is anyone
willing to defend the thesis that each lawyer should generate her own form from scratch
each time a new form is required, even though another attorney in the office or a reliable
commercial service has already generated a similar form in the recent past?
While science is often contrasted with belief, belief plays as large a role in science
as it does in other areas of human activity. Lonergan points out that when a scientist
"[r]epeats for himself another's observations and experiments, when he works out for
himself the theorems needed to formulate the hypothesis, its presuppositions, and its
implications, when he grasps the evidence for excluding alternative views, then he does
not believe but knows." 96 But scientists do not spend all their time repeating these
procedures when they have already been performed by colleagues. Rather, InIew results,
if not disputed', tend to be assumed in further work. If the further work prospers, they
begin to be regarded with confidence." 97 Only if the further work runs into difficulties,
however, will the results relied upon come under suspicion and further scrutiny. Thus,
92 Id.
Id. at'45-46.
94 Id. at 46.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 42.
"" Id. at 43.
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Lonergan concludes that the aim of the scientist is the advancement of science through
a group process which "is operative only slightly as immanently generated knowledge
but overwhelmingly as belief." 98
Finally, while there exists in principle a distinction between immanently generated
knowledge and belief, it does not follow that two "compartments" exist in anyone's mind
and the person could retain what he "knows" and throw out what he believes. The
solution to the existence of mistaken beliefs is not to reject belief altogether. Rather, the
solution involves knowing what belief is and then reflecting critically upon its constituent
elements in each instance, such as the reliability of the source, information which the
subject obtains from other sources, or other conflicting beliefs or immanently generated
knowledge which the subject has acquired."
Thus, the lawyer, like the scientist, learns not only from the use of her own senses,
mind, and heart, but she also learns from others; not solely by repeating the operations
they have performed, but, for the most part, by taking their word for their results.
According to Lonergan, the result of such learning is that
Whrough communication and belief there are generated common sense,
common knowledge, common science, common values, a common climate of
opinion. No doubt, this public fund may suffer from blindspots, oversights,
errors, bias. But it is what we have got, and the remedy for its short-comings
is not the rejection of belief and so a return to primitivism, but the critical
and selfless stance that, in this as in other matters, promotes progress and
offsets decline.'"
' Id.
" Since mistaken beliefs are possible, it is important to discuss further how they can be elimi-
nated:
Mistaken beliefs exist, and the function of an analysis of belief is overlooked if it fails
to explain how mistaken beliefs arise and how they are to be eliminated.
[T]he problem of eliminating from one's own mind the rubbish that may have
settled there in a lifelong symbiosis of personal inquiry and believing [raises no new
issues]. For learning one's errors is but a particular case of learning. It takes as its
starting-point and clue the discovery of some precise issue on which undoubtedly one
was mistaken. It advances by inquiring into the sources that may have contributed to
that error and, perhaps, contributed to other errors as well. It asks about the motives
and the supporting judgments that, as they once confirmed one in that error, may still
be holding one in others. It investigates the consequences of the view one now rejects
and it seeks to determine whether or not they too are to be rejected. The process is
cumulative. The discovery of one error is exploited to lead to the discovery of others;
and the discovery of the others provides a still larger base to proceed to the discovery
of still more. Moreover, this cumulative process not only takes advantage of the mind's
native process of learning, in which one insight leads on to other insights that open
the way to still further insights, but it also exploits the insistence of rational conscious-
ness on consistency; for just as our love of consistency, once we have made one mistake,
leads us to make others, so the same love of consistency leads us to reject other
mistakes, when one is rejected and, at the same time, it provides us with abundant
clues for finding the others that are to be rejected.
B. LONERGAN, supra note 14, at 713-15. See also, W. QUINE, THE WEB OF BELIEF (1970). While Quine
makes some valid observations, his work is deficient in that it operates on idealist assumptions of
reality. The levels of experience, understanding, judgment of fact, and moral judgment, as well as
belief are all "looked at" as one operation.
ino B. LONERGAN, supra note 17, at 44.
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Thus it is apparent that belief is inexorably involved in every facet of our world,
including that of the lawyer. Belief is not something to be mocked or scorned as infantile
or unscientific. Rather, only that belief which is not in conformance with the above
criteria should be discouraged. Belief which is based on the criteria should be encouraged
as an enlightened and progressive phenomenon.
X. INTERFERENCE WITH JUDGMENT
If fact judgments, value judgments, and belief judgments occur, they do not always
occur without some interference. Lonergan points out that while "everyone has some
acquaintance with the spirit of inquiry and reflection, few think of making it the effective
centre of their lives; and of that few, still fewer make sufficient progress to be able to
withstand other attractions and persevere in their high purpose."nn Several forms of
bias, including what Lonergan refers to as dramatic; individual, group, and general bias,
interfere with judgment.
Lonergan denominates one such form of interference "dramatic bias." Dramatic
bias is a type of interference with judgment that occurs where elementary passions bias
understanding in practical and personal matters. Such feelings can operate to exclude
an insight, and also "No exclude the further questions that would arise from it and the
complementary insights that would carry it towards a rounded and balanced view-
point." 102 The presence of this biased, incomplete viewpoint may result in "a withdrawal
from the outer drama of human living into the inner drama of phantasy." 1 °3 Such a
result is a condition which Lonergan labels "scotosis." 134 The presence of scotosis results
in a "blind spot" in understanding which prevents a person from judging the world as
it really is. Jerome Frank has noted the presence of scotosis or what he denominates
"prejudice" in the arena of judicial decisionmaking. 05
Liu B
. LoNERGAN, supra note 14, at 225.
1" Id. at 191.
1 °5 1d.
104
[A scotosis is] a weakening of the development of common sense, a differentiation of
the persona and the ego, an alternation of suspicion and reassurance, of doubt and
rationalization. There follow an aberration of the censorship, the inhibition of un-
wanted imaginative schemes, the disassociation of affects from their initial objects and
their attachment to incongruous yet related materials, the release of affective neural
demands in dreams, and the functionally similar formation of screening memories.
Id. at 197.
'°5 Jerome Frank has observed:
Ran yard West, a practicing psychiatrist and also a close student of matters legal, makes
some comments pertinent here. He writes of the "formation of prejudice from fantasy,
a process deeply hidden from all but the most penetrating introspection ...." The
"mental processes involved" have two stages: In early life, each person has fantasies
"compounded out of (a) genuine observations made by him as a young child, (b)
perversions of truth introduced by misapprehended observations, and (c) pure inven-
tions of the mind, imposed by the early emotional life of the child upon the real or
semi-real figures around him" which "arouse his primitive and incoherent passions."
In the adult period, "the unconscious mind" achieves an "identification ... between
personalities of adult experiences and these ... fantasy figures of infancy." The
"realities of infancy . . . bias the tastes and judgments" of the adult, providing the
"unconscious prejudices" of adult life. "We meet the persons, situations, and causes,
X, Y, Z of our adult life; and to our conscious appraisement of them is contributed a
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Individual bias can also interfere with judgment. Individual bias — egoism — is an
incomplete development of intelligence which occurs when a person sees himself as the
center of the universe. 1 °C Such egoism results in an exclusion of correct understanding
precisely because the person refuses to inquire and to ask additional questions which
could lead to answers that conflict with his self-interest. This is not to say, however, that
the person operating under individual bias, who engages in one type of "flight from
understanding," is less intelligent than others. As Lonergan points out, the opposite may
in fact be the case:
[m]ore than many others, [the egoist] has developed a capacity to face issues
squarely and to think them through. The cool schemer, the shrewd calculator,
the hardheaded self-seeker are very far from indulging in mere wishful
thinking. Without the detachment of intelligence, they cannot invent and
implement strategems that work. 1 °7
The problem remains, however, in that the egoist refuses to give free reign to his
intelligence and to ask the further questions that would lead to a profound modification
of his solution. 118
It almost goes without saying that individual bias is present in many lawyers. There
are many shrewd and hardheaded lawyers whose paramount goal is economic self-
interest. The result is that these lawyers refuse to ask further questions about the legal
system in general, or certain laws in particular, because these lawyers possess political
and financial power which is dependent on the status quo. Any change is perceived as
a threat to their self-interest. Lonergan notes that this "flight from understanding,"
which stems from the presence of individual bias in our society, results in unintelligent
policies and inept courses of action: "[t]he situation deteriorates to demand still further
insights and, as they are blocked, policies become more unintelligent and action more
inept."°° According to Lonergan, even worse is that "the deteriorating situation seems
to provide the uncritical, biased mind with factual evidence in which the bias is claimed
to be verified. So in ever increasing measure intelligence comes to be regarded as
irrelevant to practical living.""°
Interference with judgment can also result from the presence of "group bias."'"
Group bias occurs where members of various groups see their respective groups as
superior and others as inferior. The group tends to project its own inadequacies onto
other groups and treat them with hostility or contempt. The classic example of this
phenomenon is the "master race" mentality exhibited by the Nazis earlier in this century.
Groups can also be distinguished, however, along the lines of technological, economic,
factor from our unconscious memories, which judges them as if they were the A II IC
of some forgotten, far-off experiences of childhood." Many of us therefore often "do
not see things and people as they are." ... It is, says West, by no means easy for a
man to "realize and feel the scope of his own prejudicial judgments," to "appreciate
fully the measure of . prejudice" in his own life.
f. FRANK, supra note 36, at 151-52.
106 B. LONERGAN, supra note 14, at 220.
107 Id.
106 Id.
mg Id. at xiv.
110 Id.
'° Id. at 222.
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and political aspects, to name a few. The role of groups and thus of group bias in society
becomes significant in the context of social progress.
Social progress is a succession of changes brought about by the functioning of
common sense in the community. Lonergan notes, "[h]owever, while the practical com-
mon sense.of a community may be a single whole, its parts reside separately in the minds
of members of social groups, and its development occurs as each group intelligently
responds to the succession of situations with which it immediately deais." 12 Thus, Lo-
nergan notes that if all group responses were made by "pure intelligences," seeking to
implement that which is truly worthwhile for society, then continuous social progress
might be inevitable. Instead, group responses are usually made by persons whose intel-
ligences . are affected or even warped by their membership in and allegiance to the group:
"Ulust as the individual egoist puts further questions up to a point, but desists before
reaching conclusions incompatible with his egoism, so also the group is prone to have a
blind spot for the insights that reveal its well-being to be excessive or its usefulness at
an end."" 3
Again, it hardly needs to be said that group bias is present within lawyers as a group.
Questions relating to availability of legal services, legal reform, and professional reform
are consistently ignored by many lawyers because further inquiry could lead to questions
and conclusions which threaten the economic well-being or prestige of lawyers as a group
within our society. As Lonergan notes, the presence over time of this type of bias in
society results in an unhealthy social distortion;
Society becomes stratified; its flower is [lawyers are] far in advance of average
attainment; its roots appear to be the survival of the rude achievement of a
forgotten age. Classes become distinguished, not merely by social function,
but also by social success; and the new differentiation finds expression not
only in conceptual labels but also in deep feelings of frustration, resentment,
bitterness, and hatred." 4
Finally, general bias can interfere with judgment.' 1 ` This bias occurs when the person
makes common sense the sole object of inquiry and action. According to Lonergan, this
interference with judgment results because common sense is by definition incapable of
"2/d. at 223.
" 3 Id.
" 4 Id. at 224. Lonergan states further:
While the individual egoist has to put up with the public censure of his ways, group
egoism not merely directs development to its own aggrandizement but also provides
a market for opinions, doctrines, theories that will justify its ways and, at the same
time, reveal the misfortunes of other groups to be due to their depravity. Of course,
as long as the successful group continues to succeed, as long as it meets each new
challenge with a creative response, it feels itself the child of destiny and it provokes
more admiration and emulation than resentment and opposition. But development,
guided by group egoism, is bound to be one-sided. It divides the body social not merely
into those that have and those that have not but also makes the former the represen-
tatives of the cultural flower of the age to leave the latter apparent survivals from a
forgotten era. Finally, in the measure that the group encouraged and accepted an
ideology to rationalize its own behavior, in the same measure it will he blind to the
real situation, and it will be bewildered by the emergence of a contrary ideology that
will call to consciousness an opposed group egoism.
B. LONERGAN, supra note 17, at 54.
15 B. LONERGAN, supra note 14, at 225-42.
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analyzing itself. Common sense "[i]s incapable of coming to grasp that its peculiar danger
is to extend its legitimate concern for the concrete and the immediately practical into
disregard of larger issues and indifference to long-term results." 8
 The most obvious
example of general bias occurs in politics. In many instances, the officeholder is found
to be concerned only with stopgap measures which may work in the short term but are
doomed to fail in the long run. This occurs because common sense is only concerned
with the immediately practical, such as getting "results" before the politician is up again
for re-election.
General bias also permeates the legal profession through the unreflective acceptance
of "role" by many lawyers. These lawyers learn their role within the legal system and
then perform, albeit brilliantly, in many instances. Nevertheless, their only concern is
with winning this case, planning this estate and pleasing this client. While such common-
sense insights, judgments, and activities are important, such practicality cannot be the
guiding principle in our society because, by its very nature, it is incapable of planning
for the long term.
The presence of the above-stated biases in society results in still another problem.
A lawyer seeking to remedy the distortions which exist in his community is confronted
with the phenomenon of "ressentiment."" 7
 The notion of ressentiment is described by
Lonergan:
[R]essentiment is a re-feeling of a specific clash with someone else's value-
qualities. The someone else is one's superior physically or intellectually or
morally or spiritually. The re-feeling is not active or aggressive but extends
over time, even a life-time. It is a feeling of hostility, anger, indignation that
is neither repudiated nor directly expressed. What it attacks is the value-
quality that the superior person possessed and the inferior not only lacked
but also feels unequal to acquiring. The attack amounts to a continuous
belittling of the value in question, and it can extend to hatred and even
violence against those that possess that value-quality." 8
Thus, the lawyer who seeks to transcend individual and group interest to achieve change
for the good of society as a whole may find that those around her react with feelings of
hostility, anger, and indignation. While nothing might be said directly to her, the values
possessed by the lawyer would still be subject to continuous belittling. As Lonergan notes,
"[plerhaps [the] worst feature [of ressentiment] is that its rejection of one value involves
a distortion of the whole scale of values and that this distortion can spread through a
whole social class, a whole people, a whole epoch."' 19
XI. UNIFICATION BY WAY OF EXAMPLE
Some of the points made earlier in the article may he collectively illustrated through
an example involving a civil-bench trial. In essence, the role of a judge in a bench trial
involves reaching a decision or judgment as to the disposition of the parties involved in
the case, such as the amount of damages to be paid by one party to another. Such a
decision involves a judgment of value. For the bottom line is that the judge decides the
16 Id. at 226.
m B. LONERGAN, supra note 17, at 33.
,,8
 Id.
119 Id.
July 1986]
	 INSIGHT INTO LAWYERING	 707
case based on a judgment which combines a knowledge of the human world, including
the legal world, with his or her feelings and value preferences.
There are many factors which enter into a judge's decision in a given case. First,
there is the judge's knowledge of the human world or the real world mediated by
meaning. As Jerome Frank notes in COURTS ON TRIAL,'" one important aspect of the
"human world" is the facts of the case at hand.' 2 ' Frank characterizes the "facts" deduced
by the judge from the witnesses' testimony as merely a judicial "guess." Employing
Lonerganian terminology, however, it would be more accurate to characterize this fact-
finding process as one involving belief. Again, belief involves a value judgment as to the
trustworthiness or competency of the witness, which can be de facto absolute, or, as in
most cases, merely probable.
An additional element of the human world which the judge considers is statutes as
well as prior judicial decisions.' 22
 Minimally, statutes and opinions contain value judg-
ments and common-sense generalizations regarding how to order society. These judg-
ments and generalizations are expressed as rules, procedures, policies, and principles.'"
Finally, a very important element of the "human world" which the judge considers is
the larger all-encompassing context of the "jig-saw puzzle" of the world of common
' 20 J. FRANK, Supra note 36.
12 ' Id. at 61.
'" Judge Hutcheson and Max Radin state that in many instances, statutes and rules only
consciously come into play after the decision has been made:
[Max Raclin] tells us, first, that the judge is a human being; that therefore he does
not decide causes by the abstract application of' rules of justice or of right, but having
heard the cause and determined that the decision ought to go this way or that way,
he then takes up his search for some category of the law into which the case will fit.
He tells us that the judge really feels or thinks that a certain result seems desirable,
and he then tries to make his decision accomplish that result. ''What makes certain
results seem desirable to the judge?" he asks, and answers his question that that seems
desirable to the judge which, according to his training, Isis experience, and his general
point of view, strikes him as the jural consequence that ought to flow from the facts,
and he advises us that what gives the judge the struggle in the case is the effort so to
state the reasons fur his judgment that they will pass muster.
[Hutcheson concludes,] [t]here is nothing unreal or untrue about this picture of
the judge, nor is there anything in it from which a just judge should turn away. It is
true, and right that it is true, that judges really do try to select categories or concepts
into which to place a particular case so as to produce what the judge regards as a
righteous result, or, to avoid any confusion in the matter of morals, I will say a "proper
result."
Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q.
274, 285 (1929) (quoting Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, -II A.B.A. J.
357, 359 (1925)).
' 25 In regard to such legal principles or rules, Jerome Hall notes:
In the thinking that precedes action and gives it distinctive character, "law" retains its
traditional connotation as "rules." As such, they serve to guide the conduct of laymen
and officials and they are also the basis for distinguishing some actions from others.
Just as it is unprofitable to keep in separate compartments the actions of legislators,
laymen, judges and ministerial officers so, too, it is indefensible to separate the theo-
rizing about rules, precedents and the like from the actions that to some degree reflect
that thinking as their internal dimension.
J. HALL, supra note 1, at 153 (emphasis added).
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meaning. This involves the judge's participating in a court, a legal system, a state; as
well as his or her place in a family, a community, a culture."
The judge is aware that his or her actions will affect the common world of meaning
and conversely, that that world will affect him or her. For example, a controversial
decision, for whatever reason, may provoke the indignation of the judge's peers in the
bar association and the community as a whole. Or, in some instances, it may be clear
that an appellate court will reverse the decision. The decision also could be seen as
"breaking new ground," and the community could receive it in a positive manner. Finally,
the decision might "fit" within the existing "order" and raise no comment whatsoever.
In each instance, the action of the judge always occurs within a larger context — the
common-sense world of meaning.
Along with the judge's knowledge of his or her world, of no less importance are his
or her feelings and value preferences. The values which the judge prefers and feels to
be important may not have been reflected upon and thus may be distorted. Interference
with a proper apprehension of values could result from any of the biases previously
discussed. Because of the presence of general bias, the judge may continually view the
practical, short-term result as controlling. Individual and group bias may result in the
judge's decision being biased by what is most advantageous for him or her, either as an
individual or as a member of a group. Finally, dramatic bias involving repression,
inhibition, and transference of neural stimuli may result in a decision which is biased. 125
Whether or not bias is present, the judge will have to make a decision, and that
choice necessitates a value judgment as to what that judge at that time decides is worth-
while for him or her to do. Given that the judge has made a decision, he or she still
must write the opinion, making findings of fact and law. Once again the judge is faced
with a value judgment, for he or she either must choose to frame those "findings" in
language which reflects the fact and value judgments he or she has made or choose not
to. While no judge can describe fully the constituents of his or her value judgment,
certainly some description is possible. However, a judge normally describes, and the
"legal world" expects him or her to describe, his or her particular value judgment in
terms of prior written value judgments/common-sense generalizations, such as, statutes,
policies, rules, or opinions. Because the judge's decision and opinion involve his or her
value judgment in those concrete circumstances, the judgment cannot be articulated fully
by employing statutes, rules, definitions, and policies which are necessarily abstract.' 26
Nevertheless, such an abstract logical characterization is expected, and therefore, in
many situations the judge employs linguistic manipulation in order to maintain "logical"
consistency. 127
124 See supra text accompanying notes 44-70.
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
126 Again, abstract rules cannot take into account the dynamic nature of society, nor the judge's
feelings and therefore cannot adequately describe the concrete value judgment made by the judge
in a particular situation. In the judicial process, the only concepts which remain invariant over time
are the transcendental notions. See supra note 81.
'"	 By common consent, contracts is the most confused and most uncertain area in
conflict of laws. American courts, to be sure, frequently purport to apply some hard-
and-fast rule, as that a contract is governed by the law of the place of contracting,
which is the place where the last act that is necessary to make the contract binding
took place, or by the law of the place of performance. But the judges who adopt this
approach rarely practice what they preach. Sometimes they evade the rule they have
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Finally, the judge's opinion illustrates the different aspects of meaning. The opinion
handed down by the judge involves several meaning functions. First, the cognitive
function is present; the judge is able to formulate an opinion, and the parties as well as
others are able to understand that formulation (in most cases). Second, the decision as
it exists at that moment, in that court, becomes constituted and effective through com-
munication. The opinion will have both a proximate and a remote effective meaning.
Its proximate effective meaning is that a party reads the opinion and then pays damages
or obeys an injunction (with or without the help of the sheriff). Its remote effective
meaning is that many people will plan and litigate in the future only after considering
the published opinion.
XII. THE PROBLEM
The principles discussed previously can now be placed within the larger perspective
of history and social change. Lonergan points out that the course of history is in accord
with emergent probability. That history. according to Lonergan, "is the cumulative
realization of concretely possible schemes of recurrence in accord with successive sched-
ules of probabilities." 128 Human history, however, differs from history involving nonsen-
tient life forms in that among the probable possibilities relating to human history is
man's ability to form insights and take the initiative in bringing about material and social
conditions which make certain schemes concretely possible, probable, and actual,' 29
announced by giving a different meaning to some key term, as the place of contracting.
More frequently, they change the rule itself from case to case, and yet talk in each
individual opinion as if the rule relied upon in that particular instance stood alone
without competitors. So, for example, the New York courts formerly relied on which-
ever one of four inconsistent rules as to the law governing the validity of a contract
was best suited for the purpose at hand. This practice, however, was not frankly
recognized in the opinions; each customarily mentioned but a single rule and simply
ignored what the courts had said on other occasions. A similar approach has been
taken in other States.
Reese, Power of Parties to Choose taw Governing their Contract, PROC. AM. Soc. INT 1, L. 49-50 (1960)
(footnotes omitted).
", B. LONERGAN, supra note 14, at 227.
129 See supra note 67 for a definition of a scheme of recurrence. Lonergan observes that the
world in process involves conditioned schemes of recurrence, Thus the distinction is made between
the actual seriation, the probable seriation, and the possible seriation of schemes of recurrence:
The actual seriation is unique. It consists of the schemes that actually were, are,
or will be functioning in our universe along with precise specifications of their places,
their durations, and their relations to one another.
The probable seriation differs from the actual. For the actual diverges non-
systematically from probability expectations. The actual is the factual, but the probable
is ideal. Hence, while the actual seriation has the uniqueness of the matter of fact, the
probable seriation has to exhibit the cumulative ramifications of probable alternatives.
Accordingly, the probable seriation is not a single series but a manifold of series. At
each stage of world process there is a set of probable next stages, of which some are
more probable than others. The actual seriation includes only the stages that occur.
The probable seriation includes all that would occur without systematic divergence
from the probabilities.
The possible seriation is still more remote from actuality. It includes all the
schemes of recurrence that could be devised from the classical laws of our universe.
It orders them in a conditioned series that ramifies not only along the lines of probable
alternatives but also along lines of mere possibility or negligible probability.
B. LONERGAN, supra note 14, at 1 19.
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According to Lonergan, it is "[i]n this fashion [that] man becomes for man the executor
of the emergent probability of human affairs. Instead of being developed by his envi-
ronment, man turns to transforming his environment in his own self-development."'"
Although man remains under emergent probability, this subjugation differs from
the subjugation of electrons or of evolving species. First, man can anticipate possible
schemes or scenarios and then "make" them happen, at least to some degree. Second,
man can work out the manner in which prior insights and decisions determine the
possibilities and probabilities of later insights and decisions. Lonergan comments that
[t]his control of the emergent probability of the future can be exercised not
only by the individual in choosing his career and in forming his character,
not only by adults in educating the younger generation, but also by mankind
in its consciousness of its responsibility to the future of mankind."'
Thus, Lonergan emphasizes that "[t]he challenge of history is for man progressively to
restrict the realm of chance or fate or destiny and progressively to enlarge the realm of
conscious grasp and deliberate choice."'"
While common sense is an important part of this endeavor, it cannot be the guiding
principle. For when common sense runs amok and is not guided by a higher principle,
incoherent policies and enterprises abound. As Lonergan notes,
the general bias of common sense involves the disregard of timely and fruitful
ideas; and this disregard not only excludes their implementation but also
deprives subsequent [historical] stages both of the further ideas, to which
they would give rise, and of the correction that they and their retinue would
bring to the ideas that are implemented.'"
There are three major consequences which result from human history being con-
trolled by general bias. First, the social situation deteriorates cumulatively, for "just as
progress consists in a realization of some ideas that leads to the realization of others
until a whole coherent set is concretely operative, so the repeated exclusion of timely
and fruitful ideas involves a cumulative departure from coherence."'" Thus, Lonergan
observes that "[t]he dynamic of progress is replaced by sluggishness and then by stag-
nation. In the limit, the only discernible intelligibility in the objective facts is an equilib-
rium of economic pressures and a balance of national powers." 15
A second consequence which results from general bias is the mounting irrelevance
of detached and disinterested intelligence. As culture, religion, and philosophy become
divorced from the world of man, the world becomes less and less intelligible. More and
more events occur which seem to be senseless and irrational; these events seem to
compound themselves and multiply. This is what Lonergan labels the "social surd."'"
The increasing presence of the social surd — the senseless, the irrational — promotes
the third consequence of' general bias: the surrender of detached and disinterested
intelligence. According to Lonergan,
130 Id. at 227.
,31 Id.
132 Id. at 228.
1 " Id. at 229.
134 Id.
", Id.
136 Id. at 230.
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The fragmentary and incoherent intelligibility of the objective situation sets
the standard to which common-sense intelligence must conform. [Thus] men
of practical common sense become warped by the situation in which they
live and regard as starry-eyed idealism and silly unpracticality any proposal
that would lay the axe to the root of the social surd.'"
XI El. THE SourrioN
What then is needed to reverse social deterioration and the social surd? According
to Lonergan, what is needed is a higher unifying viewpoint which man can operate
under and thus use to control his history. This higher, unifying cultural viewpoint is
what Lonergan denominates the "cosmopolis" or critical culture.'" In our society today,
however, Lonergan points out that culture is not acting as a reflective vehicle which
passes judgment on the human world and the human institutions and systems contained
therein:
[Culture has ceased] to be an independent factor that passes a detached yet
effective judgment upon capital formation and technology, upon economy
and polity. To justify its existence, it had to become more and more practical,
more and more a factor within the technological, economic, political process,
more and more a tool that served palpably useful ends. The actors in the
drama of living become stage-hands; the setting is magnificent; the lighting
superb; the costumes gorgeous; but there is no play.'"
What then is this higher, unifying cultural viewpoint which is needed? It is a critical
culture that
is neither class nor state, that stands above all their claims, that cuts them
down to size, that is founded on the native detachment and disinterestedness
of every intelligence, that commands man's first allegiance, that implements
itself primarily through that allegiance, that is too universal to be bribed, too
impalpable to be forced, too effective to be ignored.14 0
This independent critical culture or "cosmopolis" is brought into existence through the
intellectual, psychic, and moral conversion of each person in society. In other words, each
person is asked to affirm and then continually reflect upon her own cognitional processes,
such as, knowing how she knows, how she feels, and how she comes to act.
Intellectual conversion involves the affirmation that knowing does not involve simply
"taking a look." Rather, knowing involves the interrelated moments of experiencing,
understanding, and judging. Intellectual conversion occurs when the subject affirms
herself as a knower; that is, if she affirms herself to be an intelligible concrete unity-
identity-whole, characterized by acts of sensing, perceiving, imagining, enquiring, un-
derstanding, formulating, reflecting, grasping the unconditioned, and judging. The
fulfillment of these conditions are given in the subject's own consciousness.[''
I" Id. (emphasis added).
"8 See id.
1 " Id. at 237.
'40 Id. at 238.
191 TYRRELL, supra note 8, at 91. If one attempts to deny this immanent cognitional structure,
an internal contradiction develops. For in order to deny the structure the subject would have to
employ it. As Tyrrell states:
712	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 27:681
As Lonergan points out, the intellectual conversion necessarily entails the rejection
of the philosophical counter-positions of the naive realist, the empiricist, and the idealist:
The naive realist knows the world mediated by meaning but thinks he knows
it by looking. The empiricist restricts objective knowledge to sense experi-
ence; for him, understanding and conceiving, judging and believing are
merely subjective activities. The idealist insists that human knowing always
includes understanding as well as sense; but he retains the empiricist's notion
of reality, and so he thinks of the world mediated by meaning as not real
but ideal. Only the critical realist can acknowledge the facts of human know-
ing and pronounce the world mediated by meaning to be the real world;
and he can do so only inasmuch as he shows that the process of experiencing,
understanding, and judging is a process of self-transcendence. 12
Psychic conversion differs from intellectual conversion inasmuch as the former
notion involves the subject getting in touch with her emotions and integrating them into
consciousness±" She must be attentive and open to her feelings rather than reject or
suppress them. She must try to understand what is going on in terms of her feelings
and then try to judge what actually is the situation. On the basis of her judgments, the
subject may then decide that she must either change those feelings or change some
external relation or action.
ISlelf-affirmation is an immanent law of intelligence ... any attempt to deny that
one is a knower in the sense specified is to involve oneself in a contradiction between
statement and performance.... [For] to deny that one is a unity-identity-whole char-
acterized by acts of sensing, perceiving, inquiring, understanding, reflecting, and
judging, one must appeal to one's own experience, elucidate one's understanding,
indicate sufficiency of evidence for judgment, and claim personal responsibility for
the judgment one makes. Self-affirmation accordingly, in Lonergan's analysis, cannot
ultimately be avoided by anyone who endeavours to operate in full accord with the
exigencies of intelligence and rationality and on the basis of his own cognitive expe-
rience.
Id. at 92-93.
l42 B. LONERGAN, supra note 17, at 238-39. See supra text accompanying note 79.
145 See generally TYRRELL, On the Possibility and Desirability of a Christian Psychotherapy, in LONERGAN
WORKSHOP (1978). But see j. STONE, LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IN THE SECOND HALF CENTURY
(1966). Stone states that if introspection was to he undertaken by judges, those judges, as well as
the legal system as a whole, would probably collapse:
[The] demand for complete judicial awareness and articulation of all factors
entering into judgment, if we tried to build these into institutional arrangements,
would vastly increase the internal and external stresses upon judges. Save with the
very ablest this would lead, in day-after-day, year-after-year functioning, to increasing
stress, delay, faltering of decision, and even breakdown. And the recruiting of abler
men would become progressively more difficult. So that the judicial institution would
be threatened both in its incumbents and the succession after them.
Id. at 84 (footnote omitted). It is unclear to the author what Stone means when he speaks of
"institutional arrangements." Stone is right in saying that standardized psychological exams, given
at intervals during a judge's tenure on the bench, may not be a good idea. Also, he is correct in
saying that a judge could not be expected to articulate all the factors which entered into his decision.
However, if Stone means that judges should not reflect upon their cognitive operations and thus
should not try to adhere to the transcendental precepts, then Stone is proposing that the judge
accept biases and engage in flight from understanding. In the author's view, it is not reflection but
flight from understanding which threaten:: the judicial institution, "both in its incumbents and the
succession after them." Id.
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In this way, the person can avoid the influence of dramatic bias. Such self-evaluation
is by no means an easy process and in certain situations may be difficult or impossible
to achieve without help. As Lonergan notes, "NI.
 we would know what is going on within
us, if we would learn to integrate it with the rest of our living, we have to inquire,
investigate, seek counsel."'"
Finally, moral conversion involves changing the criterion of one's decisions and
choices from mere satisfactions to values, from what is only apparently worthwhile to
what is truly worthwhile. As Lonergan puts it, "rmioral conversion consists in opting for
the truly good, even for value against satisfaction when value and satisfaction conflict." 145
He continues, "by deliberation, evaluation, decision, action, we can know and do, not
just what pleases us, but what truly is good, worthwhile." 146
This of course raises the question of what is truly good or worthwhile. Lonergan
describes the human good as follows:
The human good . . . is at once individual and social. Individuals do not
just operate to meet their needs but cooperate to meet one another's needs.
As the community develops its institutions to facilitate cooperation, so indi-
viduals develop skills to fulfill the roles and perform the tasks set by the
institutional framework. Though the roles are fulfilled and the tasks are
performed that the needs be met, still all is done not blindly but knowingly,
not necessarily but freely. The process is not merely the service of man; it is
above all the making of man, his advance in authenticity, the fulfillment of
his affectivity, and the direction of his work to the particular goods and a
good of order that are worth while. 147
When moral conversion occurs, "Wears of discomfort, pain, privation have less power
to deflect one from one's course. Values are apprehended where before they were
overlooked. Scales of preference shift. Errors, rationalizations, ideologies fall and shatter
to leave one open to things as they are and to man as he should be." 148
The above conversions do not involve merely assenting to certain propositions at a
moment in time. Rather, they denote an approach to living which must be constantly
striven for, year in and year out. Such an approach involves knowing what it is to know,
to feel, and to choose, and reflecting on those cognitional processes. The subject can
thus recognize and deal with those biases, beliefs and feelings that interfere with judg-
ments of fact, value, and belief.
In order to reverse social decline or deterioration — the social surd — it is essential
that lawyers as individuals undergo these conversions and participate in the cosmopolis.
In our society lawyers function as parents, members of their respective communities,
legislators, judges, businesspeople, government policymakers, professors, and private
practitioners. As such, each must bring his or her self-appropriated mind and heart to
bear on the problems which confront our society. Lawyers must execute value judgments
and actions based on what the lawyer judges to be truly good and truly worthwhile.
144 B. LONERGAN, supra note 17, at 122-23.
145 Id. at 240.
146 Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
147 Id, at 52.
'48 Id. Although the topic will not be discussed here, religious conversion can affect moral
conversion, since according to Lonergan, it is only through God's love and grace acting within us
that we are able to sustain a lasting moral conversion.
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Rather than owing his or her first allegiance to common sense, institutions, or the "rule
of law," the lawyer must owe his or her allegiance to the transcendental precepts:
Progress proceeds from originating value, from subjects being their true
selves by observing the transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent,
Be reasonable, Be responsible. Being attentive includes attention to human
affairs. Being intelligent includes a grasp of hitherto unnoticed or unrealized
possibilities. Being reasonable includes the rejection of what probably would
not work but also the acknowledgment of what probably would. Being re-
sponsible includes basing one's decisions and choices on an unbiased evalu-
ation of short-term and long-term costs and benefits to oneself, to one's
group, and to other groups.
Progress, of course, is not some single improvement but a continuous
flow of them. But the transcendental precepts are permanent. Attention,
intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility are to be exercised not only
with respect to the existing situation but also with respect to the subsequent
changed situation. It spots the inadequacies and repercussions of the previous
venture to improve what is good and remedy what is defective. More gen-
erally, the simple fact of change of itself makes it likely that new possibilities
will have arisen and old possibilities will have advanced in probability. So
change begets further change and the sustained observance of the transcen-
dental precepts makes these cumulative changes an instance of progress. 19
"9 Id. at 53. The author also interprets Roberto Unger to say that the exercise of power in
society can be justified when such power is guided by a critical culture or cosmopolis:
Unless people regain the sense that the practices of society represent some sort of
natural order instead of a set of arbitrary choices, they cannot hope to escape. from
the dilemma of unjustified power. But how can this perception of immanent order be
achieved in the circumstances of modern society?
The mere existence of moral agreement within a particular association would not
bring about this end. First, it would be necessary for the subversion of inequality to
proceed to such a point that people would be entitled to place greater confidence in
collective choices as expressions of a shared human nature or of the intrinsic demands
of social order rather than as a product of the interests of dominant groups. Second,
it would be indispensable that this experience of increasing equality also make possible
an ever more universal consensus about the immanent order of social life and thus
help refine further the understanding of what equality means. The first condition
without the second is empty. The second without the first is dangerous because it
threatens to consecrate the outlook of the most powerful and articulate elements in
the society.
Even if one assumes that the vision of an indwelling pattern of right [cant be
created and justified, one may still wonder whether this vision could be kept from
stilling criticism and change. To preserve the possibility of transcending the present,
it is important to remain aware of the inherent imperfection of any one system of
community practices as a source of insight into the requirements of social life. For if
one takes seriously the notion that men make themselves in history, these requirements
develop over time rather than remain static. Openness toward the future means that
one must value the conflictual process by which communities are created over time
and satisfactory relations are established among them as much as the internal cohesion
of any communal group.
Such a reconciliation of immanent order and transcendent criticism would imply
a greater replacement than we could now comprehend of bureaucratic law or the rule
of law by what in a sense could be called custom. This customary law would have
many of the marks we associate with custom: its lack of a positive and a public character
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XIV. CRITICAL REALISM AS A FOUNDATION FOR JURISPRUDENCE
It is apparent from the preceding discussion that the classicist's, legal positivist's,
and the legal realist's theories provide an inadequate account of the legal process. The
classicist or natural-law approach involves a philosophical stance which views society and
law as static, universal concepts:
it is limited to the essential, necessary, universal; it is so phrased as to
hold for all men whether they are awake or asleep, infants or adults, morons
or geniuses; it makes it abundantly plain that you can't change human nature;
the multiplicity and variety, the developments and achievements, the break-
downs and catastrophes of human living, all have to be accidental, contingent,
particular, and so have to lie outside the field of scientific interest as classically
conceived.' 5°
Such a classically oriented stance does not provide an adequate foundation for jurispru-
dence, for jurisprudence should be interested in every human phenomenon. Not abstract
or ideal man, hut, at least in principle, "the men of every time and place, all their
thoughts words and deeds, the accidental as well as the essential, the contingent as well
as the necessai y, the particular as well as the universal, are to be summoned before the
bar of human understanding."' 5 '
The legal-positivist perspective does not provide an adequate foundation for juris-
prudence because it fails to provide for the dynamic role of human intelligence and
common-sense meaning in shaping the human world. The positivist perspective provides
a view of the world and the legal process based on inductive reasoning and premised
upon a mechanistic world:
"The common law," wrote Hammond in 1880, "must be learned, like
the laws of the world, inductively. The decided cases of the past are so many
observations upon the practical workings of these laws, from which the true
theory is to be inferred, — precisely as the astronomer infers the planet's
orbit from his observation of its position at many different times. The ob-
served facts are authoritative: our inferences from them are theory; but it is
the formation of that theory which enables us to carry our observations
farther and more intelligently, and thus to arrive gradually at the true
understanding of the laws that govern the moral as well as those that govern
the material universe." 152
Yet, as noted earlier, as human intelligence develops, there is a significant change of
roles. According to Lonergan, "[Mess and less importance attaches to the probabilities of
appropriate constellations of circumstances. More and more attaches to the probabilities
of occurrence of insight, communication, agreement, decision. Man does not have to
wait for his environment to make him."'" Again, the world of common-sense meaning
and its largely emergent and implicit quality. Yet it would differ from custom in
making room for a distinction between what is and what ought to be. It would become
less the stable normative order of a particular group than the developing moral .
language of mankind.
R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 240-41 (1976).
1 " B. LONERGAN, Dimensions in Meaning, in COLLECTION 262 (1967).
151 Id.
152
 J. FRANK, LAW AND TILE MODERN MIND 96 (1930).
159 Id. at 210.
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is not a static world: "Nile advance of technology, the formation of capital, the devel-
opment of the economy, the evolution of the state are not only intelligible but intelli-
gent."'"
Finally, the legal realists would confine their scope of inquiry to the observation of
behavior. As justice Holmes stated, "[tjhe prophecies of what the courts will do in fact,
and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."L" This perspective, which
restricts the legal "science" to "observable" or "tangible" facts only, is not adequate to
provide a foundation for jurisprudence because it also ignores the common-sense world
of meaning.' 56 As Professor Kantorowicz points out,'" the realist position fails to rec-
ognize that the essential relations in law are never observable. Kantorowicz notes, for
example, that "at the same moment that a man dies in an accident without having made
his will, his new born child may have become a rich man by having inherited the
deceased's property without anybody knowing it." 158 He concludes that Injothing in this
important legal change is in any way observable — and so it is everywhere in law. It Is
the meaning of observable realities with which the lawyer is concerned but meanings are
not observable, still less tangible."' 59
Given the inherent inability of classical science (natural law), legal positivism, and
legal realism to give an adequate account of the "legal world," Jerome Hall states that
what is needed is a dynamic theory which can take into account "law as rules":
The inevitable fact is that rules of law supply the rational factor that serves
as a practical guide to officials and laymen, and ... they provide the distinc-
tive features of certain actions that otherwise dissolve in an amorphous ocean
of behavior; they supply the structures that the mind grasps to give distinctive
meaning to legal experience. The need, therefore, is not to dismiss law as
rules, but to take account of them in a dynamic theory.' 6"
It is the author's thesis that critical realism can provide a theory which can take into
account law as rules and provide a foundation upon which an adequate jurisprudence
could be built.
First and foremost, critical realism recognizes that the world of common-sense
meaning is much more intricate and complex than the world of scientific meaning. Thus,
legal models which are based upon mechanistic or natural-science models are at best
misleading. 161
 Instead, the law must be seen as a conglomeration of common-sense
generalizations which are necessarily incomplete until applied in a specific instance. As
seen earlier, the precise meaning of a law at any given time is dependent upon the value
judgments and actions of judges, lawyers, and laypersons at that time.
Thus, "the law" can be described most accurately as a facet of the common-sense
world of meaning, which provides a common meaning framework through which the
' 54 Id.
155 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
156 See supra text accompanying notes 59-70.
' 57 Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism about Realism, 43 YALE L. REV. 1240 (1934).
l" Id. at 1249.
1 " Id.
' 6° J. HALL, supra note I, at 161.
151 Instead, the law must be seen as a conglomeration of common-sense generalizations which
are necessarily incomplete until applied in a specific instance. For as seen earlier, the precise meaning
of a law at any given moment is dependent upon the value judgments and actions of judges, lawyers,
legislators, officials and laypersons at the time.
July 1986]
	 INSIGHT INTO LAWYERING 	 717
community orders itself. Viewed from another perspective,'"the law" as we know it in
America is a complex system of meaning relations whereby social change occurs within
a context of stability. Thus, the statement that ours is a country governed by laws and
not men is true, but only in the sense that "law" is defined as an ever-changing, relational-
meaning framework. The notion that "the law" is a logically consistent and autonomous
entity must be put to rest, 162
Since "the law" is a relational-meaning framework and not an independently existing
entity, it. follows that its legitimacy can only be derived from the legitimacy of the
judgments and actions of those persons who function within the relational system. In
America, lawyers acting as practicing attorneys, judges, legislators, and government
officials play a crucial role in that regard. The judgments and actions of these lawyers
are "illegitimate" or "arbitrary" to the extent that they do not involve the "truly worth-
while."' 63 Thus, the ultimate grounding and legitimacy of the legal system will hinge
upon the existence or nonexistence of psychic, intellectual, and moral conversion among
those decisionmakers. 164
Recognizing that a legal system based upon a rigid classical or positivistic theory
cannot deal adequately with the world of common-sense meaning, critical realism envis-
ages a system which is flexible enough to deal with the human world as it actually exists
in the concrete and particular. Rather than trying to fit every case into the existing legal
rules or categories, the legal system should simply recognize that in certain situations
what is truly worthwhile will not be achieved by such a mechanistic approach. Instead,
invoking the fundamental notion of equity jurisdiction, a court could simply hold, in
order to achieve the truly worthwhile in a given situation, that a rule does not apply.
Such a notion of equity is nothing new and in fact was present in England during the
century when Sir Thomas More was Chancellor.L 62
162 That "the law" is not an autonomous entity is demonstrated by Girardeau A. Spann, in an
article dealing with INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (the legislative veto case). Spann states that
indeterminacy characterizes every effort made to arrive at a principled resolution of every legal
problem because if courts only refer to legal principles, then they end up employing circular
arguments in order to justify their decisions. Spann denominates this circularity "analytical spin":
Analytical spin is the doctrinal paralysis that results when a principle acquires
meaning only by feeding on itself. Such circular reasoning makes the principle inde-
terminate. When one of the terms in a formula for applying a principle is the very
principle being applied, the formula prescribes no result and the principle does not
control the outcome. The only way to break out of analytical spin is to assign the
principle some meaning, which ultimately can be derived only from a subjective
preference.
Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. L. Rev. 473,520 (1984) (footnote omitted).
Of course, what Spann refers to as "subjective preference" would be more accurately described
in Lonerganian terminology as a value judgment which could be "objective" to the extent that the
judgment is based upon the truly worthwhile rather than upon only that which is apparently
worthwhile.
'° See supra text accompanying notes 81-88.
' 61 See supra notes 149 & 162.
' 6 ' Christopher St. German, a legal scholar and contemporary of Sir Thomas More, wrote the
following around 1530:
Be not over legalistic for extreme justice is extreme wrong .... And for the plainer
declaration what equity is, thou shalt understand that, since the deeds and acts of men
for which laws be ordained happen in divers manners infinitely, it is not possible to
make any general rule of the law but that it shall fail in some case. And makers of law
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In such a system, instead of torturing facts and legal rules to achieve a given result
"logically," judges would reaffirm the classical legal formulation but would have the
discretion to recognize that in an exceptional case the formulation just does not fit. Thus,
judges would be encouraged to state the real reasons for their decisions, rather than
being forced to cite rules which were not really considered in the decisionmaking process.
The result would be a critical dialectic between judges and legal academics centering
around the real issues involved in a judge's decision. This system thus would promote a
better understanding of both the decision itself and the legal rules involved.
It may be objected that such a relational model would place too much power in the
hands of judges and promote abuse. While abuse is possible in any system, judicial power
constrained by "hard and fast" rules within a climate of intellectual dishonesty and
unconverted consciousness would be more open to abuse than judicial power constrained
by open and honest dialectic within the context of the cosmopolis. 1 M
While a system of law based upon critical realism and the relational model will not
spring to life overnight, that does not mean that one could not evolve. Some change,
however, will be inevitable precisely because the current legal system is part and parcel
the product of classical culture. Because the classical mediation of meaning has broken
down and is being replaced by a modern mediation of meaning which deals with people
and legal rules both in the abstract and the concrete, change in our legal system will
occur. How this change will occur will depend in large part upon the actions of lawyers
who work within the system. As Lonergan notes, however, classical culture cannot be
jettisoned without being replaced and what replaces it cannot but run counter to classical
expectations:
There is bound to be formed a solid right that is determined to live in a
world that no longer exists. There is bound to be formed a scattered left,
captivated by now this, and now that new development, exploring now this
and now that new possibility. But what will count is a perhaps not numerous
center, big enough to be at home in both the old and the new, painstaking
[only] take heed to such things as may often come, and not to every particular case,
for they could not though they would. And therefore to follow the words of the law
were in some case both against Justice and the commonwealth: wherefore in some
cases it is good and even necessary to leave the words of the law, and to follow that
[which] reason and Justice requireth; and to that intent equity is ordained, that is to
say to temper and mitigate the rigour of the law.
CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT 97 (T.F.T. Plucknett J.L. Barton ed. 1974)
(language and usage modernized by the author).
Thomas More's tenure as Chancellor of England was characterized by a very different notion
of equity jurisdiction than is currently practiced in the courts of the United States and England.
Equity jurisdiction came into its own under More, and, he exercised that jurisdiction freely to
prevent injustices resulting from absurd or unjust decisions in the common law courts. After More's
time, the power of the chancellor to do equity was increasingly narrowed and straitjacketed until
today a judge's discretion to do equity is confined to categorized rules which do not differ signifi-
cantly from other legal rules. See generally J. Guy, THE PUBLIC CAREER OF SIR THOMAS MORE (1980).
166 If the legitimacy of the legal system is derived from the existence of intellectual, moral, and
psychic conversion among lawyers and not merely the ability to exercise logical reasoning, then the
question arises as to the adequacy of the approach and curriculum maintained in law schools.
Contrary to what many law professors tell freshmen law students, it would appear that the law
cannot be separated from judgments of fact and judgments of value at any level. Thus every law-
school curriculum should stimulate value-oriented discussion in general and contain a course
offering dealing with the self-appropriation of consciousness in particular.
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enough to work out one by one the transitions to be made, strong enough
to refuse half-measures and insist on complete solutions even though it has
to wait. 167
Thus, the implementation of a relational system of law does not mean that the present
system should be abandoned, but rather means that each of us should do his or her part
within the larger context of the cosmopolis to effect an ordered transition.
XV. CONCLUSION
it is important that we as lawyers know what it is we do when we think and act "as
lawyers" as well as human beings. If each of us refuses to know and to reflect upon our
thinking, feeling, and choosing, then a critical independent culture or cosmopolis will
not come into being. To paraphrase Lonergan, to justify his or her existence the lawyer
will become more and more practical, more and more a factor within the technological,
economic, political process, and more and more a tool that serves palpably useful ends.
The actors/lawyers in the drama of living become stagehands; the setting is magnificent;
the lighting superb; the costumes gorgeous; but there is no play.
MI B.LONERGAN, supra note 150, at 266-67.
